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“EYE SEE YOU”: HOW CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS HAVE UTILIZED THE NERD 
DEFENSE TO INFLUENCE JURORS’ 
PERCEPTIONS 
Sarah Merry* 
For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—
deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—
persistent, persuasive and unrealistic. Too often we hold 
fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all facts 
to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the 
comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.1 
 
Eyeglasses are “one of the most important artifacts used in 
the courtroom.”2 In 2012, a defendant’s use of eyeglasses at trial 
went to appeal in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
Harris v. United States.3 “[A]t the heart of” the appeal was 
whether the defendant’s rights were prejudiced by the Superior 
Court’s issuing a change-of-appearance instruction,4 prompted by 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.S., Santa Clara University, 
2009. I would like to thank my parents for their continued support and 
encouragement. I would also like to offer a special thanks to Professor 
Kathleen Darvil for her thoughtful suggestions and research advice, and to 
the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their careful edits and 
insightful comments.    
1 President John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address 2 
(June 11, 1962) (transcript available in the National Archives), available at 
http://research.archives.gov/description/193922.  
2 LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORETTA A. MALANDRO, COURTROOM 
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES § 1.21, at 42 (1985). 
3 See Harris v. United States, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–6 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/moj-08-cf-1405.pdf.  
4 A change-of-appearance instruction is given to a jury in circumstances 
in which a defendant has changed his or her appearance after the commission 
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the defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses at trial.5 This was 
the first time that the appeals court considered a defendant’s 
instructional challenge to a change-of-appearance instruction 
issued solely because the defendant donned unnecessary eyewear 
at trial.6 The court of appeals upheld the change-of-appearance 
instruction and determined that the evidence supported the 
instruction because the defendant had, among other things, 
donned unnecessary eyeglasses.7 Importantly, the defendant’s 
                                                          
of a crime and such alteration in appearance may be considered by the jury as 
“an indication of the defendant’s awareness of guilt and fear of 
identification.” See comments to BARBARA BERGMAN, CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.303(B) (5th ed. 2008). 
The change-of-appearance instruction issued in Harris states:  
You heard evidence that Donnell Harris attempted to change his 
appearance to avoid being identified. It is up to you to decide that he 
took these actions. If you find he did so, you may consider this 
evidence as tending to show his feelings of guilt which you may in 
turn consider as tending to show actual guilt. On the other hand, you 
may also consider that he may have taken these actions for reasons 
fully consistent with innocence in this case. If you find that Donnell 
Harris attempted to change his appearance to avoid being identified, 
you should consider such evidence along with all the other evidence 
in this case and give it as much weight as you think it deserves. 
Trial Transcript at 87–88, United States v. Harris, No. CF1-18801-07 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. 2008), reprinted in Appellant’s Limited Appendix, Harris, No. 
08-CF-1405. 
5 Zoe Tillman, Glasses an Issue in Appeal over Public Defender Intern’s 
Slaying, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012, 1:32 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/09/glasses-an-issue-in-appeal-over-
public-defender-interns-slaying.html%20/ (highlighting Donnell Harris’ use of 
eyeglasses at trial, “a seemingly innocuous detail [that was] a key issue at the 
heart of Harris’ appeal”). 
6 Compare Brief for Appellee at 32, Harris, No. 08-CF-1405 (noting 
that the D.C. Court of Appeals has never directly considered a defendant’s 
challenge to a change-of-appearance instruction prompted solely by a 
defendant’s use of eyewear at trial), with United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 
1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a defendant’s instructional challenge 
to a change-of-appearance instruction because the lower court considered a 
combination of the defendant’s beard, weight, and eyeglasses to equate to 
“profound alterations” in appearance and therefore justifying the resulting 
jury instruction). 
7  Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 (quoting the trial court, which informed 
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identity was a key issue in the case.8 However, the court of 
appeals left open a critical question: can a court issue a change-
of-appearance instruction if a defendant wears nonprescriptive 
eyeglasses to trial when the defendant’s identity is not 
specifically at issue? This tactic is known as the “nerd 
defense”—a persistent and unrealistic change in one’s 
appearance aimed at persuading a jury of the defendant’s low 
propensity to commit a crime.9 The court in Harris highlighted 
the importance of the “glasses issue” by observing that an 
increasing number of defendants have appeared at trial wearing 
nonprescriptive eyeglasses.10 
Evidence concerning a defendant’s appearance is rarely 
admitted because it is often considered more prejudicial to the 
defendant than it is probative.11 However, it is well documented 
                                                          
the jury that “there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Harris needs glasses 
to read or anything else” and found that Harris’ explanation for the use of 
eyeglasses was mere “speculation”); see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 
6, at 30 n.32. 
8 While one witness heard “‘two muffled gunshots’ and ‘could see the 
gun being held and . . . most of the [shooter’s] arm,’” the witness did not 
see the shooter’s face. Another witness also heard the gunshots but did not 
see the shooter. Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 2.  
9 Keith L. Alexander, Trendy, Non-Prescription Eyewear Latest in 
Criminal Defendant Strategic Attire, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/trendy-non-prescription-eyewear-
latest-in-criminal-defendant-strategic-attire/2012/03/17/gIQA62xJeS_story.html 
(quoting New York defense lawyer Harvey Slovis, who encourages “all his 
clients [to] wear glasses” to make them “appear less intimidating”); see also 
Michael J. Brown, Is Justice Blind or Just Visually Impaired? The Effects of 
Eyeglasses on Mock Juror Decisions, JURY EXPERT, Mar. 2011, at 1, 3, 
available at http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/ 
TJEVol23Num2_Mar2011.pdf (finding that defendants who wear eyeglasses 
appear to be more intelligent and less physically threatening).  
10 Tillman, supra note 5 (noting that Chief Judge Eric Washington found 
the eyeglasses issue particularly “compelling” because “a growing number of 
defendants had been showing up for trial wearing glasses”). 
11 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s notes (“Character 
evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to 
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on 
the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good 
man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite 
what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.” (quoting CAL. LAW 
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that juries do consider a defendant’s appearance at trial.12 Lisa 
Wayne, President of the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, stated, “the bottom line is we know people 
judge a book by its cover,” a fact that implicates “the 
fundamental fairness process.”13 A defendant who intends to 
mislead the jury with respect to his or her altered appearance—
for instance, by wearing nonprescriptive eyeglasses to trial—
circumvents character evidence rules14 by unofficially 
introducing into evidence positive character traits associated with 
eyeglasses (e.g., intelligence, honesty, decreased propensity to 
commit a violent crime).15 Unless a defendant’s identification is 
                                                          
REVISION COMM’N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING 
TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (ART. VI. EXTRINSIC POLICIES 
AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY) 615 (1964))).  
12 See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in 
the Litigation Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 
15, 48 n.137 (1990) (“[P]hysical appearance of the litigant . . . can influence 
the verdict.”). See generally Brown, supra note 9 (discussing a study linking 
juror perceptions of defendant appearance with the likelihood of guilty or not-
guilty verdicts); Annie Murphy Paul, Judging by Appearance, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (Nov. 1, 1997), http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200909/ 
judging-appearance (commenting that the influence of a defendant’s 
appearance inside the courtroom is so great that an “entire industry has 
emerged to advise lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants on their aesthetic 
choices”).  
13 Jenny Montgomery, Dressing Defendants, IND. LAW. (May 23, 2012), 
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/article/print?articleId=28848 (quoting Lisa 
Wayne). 
14 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (stating that “[e]vidence of a person’s 
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait”). A 
defendant’s appearance serves as a “substitute for any real discussion of 
character during a trial.” Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming 
Good Character Evidence to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 227, 231 n.10 (2004). 
15 See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.21, at 42 (suggesting that 
defendants should wear eyeglasses with wider lenses because people with a 
“wide-eyed look or open-eyed look are considered to be more trustworthy, 
more likable, and oftentimes more innocent”); Brown, supra note 9, at 3 
(discussing a study finding that defendants who wear eyeglasses appear more 
intelligent and less physically threatening); see also CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:23 (3d ed. 
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relevant at trial, wearing unnecessary eyeglasses to artificially 
alter appearance will not officially put a defendant’s appearance 
at issue.16 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, when a 
defendant’s identification is not specifically at issue, the 
prosecution is unable to counter this unofficial introduction of 
character evidence.17 Allowing a defendant to purposefully 
falsify a vision defect by wearing nonprescriptive eyeglasses is 
akin to allowing a defendant to appear in a wheelchair before the 
jury when he or she is perfectly mobile.18 Both actions fabricate 
                                                          
2009) (stating that “[c]haracter embraces qualities like honesty or dishonesty, 
[and] being peaceful or prone to violence”).  
16 Generally, only when a defendant’s identification is a relevant trial 
issue may a prosecutor comment on the defendant’s change in appearance 
from the time that the crime was committed to the time that the defendant 
appears at trial. GARY MULDOON, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW 
YORK § 9:262 (2012–2013); see also People v. Sanders, 622 N.Y.S.2d 986, 
987 (App. Div. 1995) (reasoning that the prosecutor’s comment on the 
defendant’s change in hairstyle was not prejudicial, in part, because the 
defendant’s identification was a factor in the trial). 
17 A defendant must first introduce evidence of his or her pertinent 
character traits at trial, and only when such evidence is officially admitted 
may the prosecution offer evidence to rebut it. See FED. R. EVID. 
404(a)(2)(A); see also FED. R. EVID. 405 (stating that proof of “character” at 
trial through instances of specific conduct is limited to situations in which “a 
person's character or character trait is an essential element of a charge, 
claim, or defense” or is otherwise admissible). However, when a defendant’s 
identity is contentious at trial, eyeglasses may serve as a disguise, thereby 
hindering identification and thus making a defendant’s use of eyeglasses 
admissible as evidence relevant to the case. See Steve D. Charman & Gary 
L. Wells, Eyewitness Lineups: Is the Appearance-Change Instruction a Good 
Idea?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/wells_articles_pdf/charman&wel
ls_appearance_change.pdf (noting that disguises typically involve the addition 
of items such as hats, eyeglasses, or masks, and observing the “strong 
debilitating effect of disguise on accurate recognition rates”); District of 
Columbia v. Carter, No. 2010 CF1 005677 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012) (offering 
an example of a prosecutor questioning a defendant’s sudden use of 
eyeglasses at trial when the defendant’s identification is at issue).  
18 See Jack Marshall, The Perplexing “Nerd Defense,” ETHICS ALARMS 
(Feb. 21, 2011, 8:18 AM), http://ethicsalarms.com/2011/02/21/the-
perplexing-nerd-defense/#more-4880 (“Glasses convey information about 
physical capabilities the same way coming into court on crutches or in a 
wheelchair does.”). 
730 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
a physical disability in order to mislead the jury. Wearing 
nonprescriptive eyeglasses can be deceptive because jurors might 
not be able to discern whether a defendant truly requires 
eyeglasses,19 and a defendant’s unnecessary use of eyeglasses 
may subtly persuade the jury by playing upon one of society’s 
most deeply rooted stereotypes: that wearing eyeglasses equates 
to higher intelligence.20 Additionally, the jury may never even 
consider the motive behind the defendant’s use of such a prop.21 
Such intentional misdirection undermines the truth-seeking 
principles of the judicial system.22 
Part I of this Note focuses on how the wearing of eyeglasses 
significantly affects the way an individual is perceived and 
briefly examines the influence of popular culture on the deeply 
ingrained stereotype that wearing eyeglasses correlates to 
increased intelligence. Part II analyzes the unofficial role of a 
defendant’s appearance in the courtroom and discusses cases that 
highlight the impact of a defendant’s appearance on criminal 
                                                          
19 See generally Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing a controlled study 
of jurors’ perceptions of eyeglasses); Alexander, supra note 9 (finding that 
eyeglasses often “escape notice”). 
20 See Åke Hellström & Joseph Tekle, Person Perception Through Facial 
Photographs: Effects of Glasses, Hair, and Beard on Judgments of 
Occupation and Personal Qualities, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 693, 695 
(articulating that judgments about intelligence and success can be traced back 
to the development of myopia caused by extensive schoolwork in childhood 
days); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (finding that eyeglasses have a 
positive correlation to increased intelligence in juror perceptions of 
defendants); Francine C. Jellesma, Do Glasses Change Children’s 
Perceptions? Effects of Eyeglasses on Peer- and Self-Perception, EUR. J. 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (2012) (arguing that “the association 
between eyeglasses and intelligence is part of the nerd stereotype” because 
“almost 50% of the people think eyeglasses are part of the physical 
appearance of nerds”).  
21 Wolfgang Manz & Helmut E. Lueck, Influence of Wearing Glasses on 
Personality Ratings: Crosscultural Validation of an Old Experiment, 27 
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 704, 704 (1968) (describing the wearing of 
eyeglasses as “an irrelevant cue,” which may lead jurors to be unconsciously 
persuaded by a defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses).  
22 See Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 95, 99 (1996) (“None of the trial’s functions are more central to its 
legitimacy than the search for truth.”).  
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trials despite the inadmissibility of such character evidence. Part 
III introduces the so-called “nerd defense” and examines the 
effect of a defendant’s use of eyeglasses on juror perceptions. 
This section further explores the use of the nerd defense by 
criminal defendants to purposefully mislead jurors. Part IV 
examines the intersection of the nerd defense and change-of-
appearance instructions. Additionally, this section criticizes the 
Harris opinion for failing to address the use of eyeglasses for 
the purpose of jury persuasion. Part V of this Note 
acknowledges the need to balance a defendant’s right of free 
expression against the potential for jury manipulation and 
proposes two solutions: (1) imposing a modified change-of-
appearance instruction that removes language relating to 
consciousness of guilt and (2) allowing for an eyeglasses inquiry 
when a defendant suddenly dons eyeglasses at trial. 
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND EYEGLASSES 
The National Eye Institute reports that, as of 2008, more 
than 150 million Americans used corrective eyewear.23 
Eyeglasses are specifically designed to correct “congenital or 
acquired vision deficits such as myopia, presbyopia, or 
astigmatism.”24 However, it is clear that wearing eyeglasses is 
no longer only for those with vision deficiencies.25 As of 2011, 
the Vision Council estimates that approximately sixteen million 
Americans wear nonprescriptive eyeglasses for the purpose of 
changing their appearances.26 
                                                          
23 PREVENT BLINDNESS AM. & NAT’L EYE INST., VISION PROBLEMS IN 
THE U.S. 12 (2008), available at http://www.preventblindness.net/site/ 
DocServer/VPUS_2008_update.pdf.  
24 Helmut Leder et al., The Glasses Stereotype Revisited: Effects of 
Eyeglasses on Perception, Recognition, and Impression of Faces, 70 SWISS J. 
PSYCHOL. 211, 211 (2011). 
25 See id. (describing how eyeglasses not only serve to correct eyesight 
but also function as facial accessories that are linked to fashion demands); see 
also ESSILOR OF AM. & LUXOTTICA GRP., 20/20 OPTICIANS’ 2008 HANDBOOK 
4–5 (4th ed. 2008) (observing that eyeglasses can be useful for those who 
wish to project their individualism or who simply desire to appear 
fashionable). 
26 Michelle Healy, Prescription Eyeglass Frames Get Softer Look, USA 
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A. The Impact of the Eye Region on Perception of the Face 
Humans, from their earliest stages of life, are drawn to the 
eye region.27 In fact, infants recognize eyes before they are able 
to recognize faces.28 The eyes play a critical role in developing 
perceptions of the face.29 The eye region is also fundamental to 
nonverbal communication because emotions, attention, and 
intentions are all perceived through observing one’s eye gaze.30 
For example, wide-open eyes signal the emotions of surprise and 
fear.31 A study designed specifically to measure the relative time 
a subject looks at the eye region during a “social impression-
formation task” revealed that eyes are the facial feature that 
people spend the most time analyzing.32 When presented with 
static facial displays,33 subjects spent 43.4% of their visual 
inspection time on the eye region and only 12.6% of their visual 
inspection time on the mouth region.34 The social impression-
formation task is pertinent in a courtroom setting because a 
                                                          
TODAY (Sept. 15, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/LIFE/usaedition/ 
2011-09-15-eyeglass-frames_ST_U.htm. 
27 Jellesma, supra note 20, at 2.  
28 M.J. Taylor et al., Eyes First! Eye Processing Develops Before Face 
Processing in Children, 12 NEUROREPORT 1671, 1676 (2001). 
29 Dan Nemrodov and Roxane J. Itier, The Role of Eyes in Early Face 
Processing: A Rapid Adaptation Study of the Inversion Effect, 102 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHOL. 783, 793 (2011).  
30 R.J. Itier & M. Batty, Neural Bases of Eye and Gaze Processing: The 
Core of Social Cognition, 33 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 843, 
844 (2009) (noting that “the human brain has developed a very complex 
cognitive system of gaze direction analysis based on perceptual elements of 
faces and eyes”). 
31 Id. at 845. 
32 Stephen W. Janik et al., Eyes as the Center of Focus in the Visual 
Examination of Human Faces, 47 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 857, 857–58 
(1978); see also Leder et al., supra note 24, at 211 (noting that eyes are 
located in a “prominent position in the visual field”). 
33 Static facial displays depict no movement in the facial region of the 
person shown in the slide. Janik et al., supra note 32, at 858. 
34 Subjects spent a greater portion of their looking time on the eye region 
as compared to the hair, nose, ear, or mouth regions, regardless of the facial 
expression or sex of the person depicted in the slide. Id.  
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defendant’s facial features will be seemingly static to the jury.35 
Generally, if a defendant does not take the stand to speak in his 
or her own defense,36 there will not be occasion for prolonged 
interaction between a defendant’s eyes and mouth that may 
affect the viewer’s primary focus on the defendant’s eye 
region.37 Because eyeglasses significantly alter the appearance of 
the eye region, wearing eyeglasses impacts the type of social 
information that is perceived through facial processing.38 
B. Studies Concerning the Effect of Eyeglasses on Judgment 
and Perception 
Social information about others is gleaned through facial 
processing, and “even the briefest of glances at a face is 
sufficient to furnish a wealth of knowledge about its owner.”39 
To form judgments and perceptions of others, people rely 
heavily on their cognitive representations (schemata).40 
Collectively shared schemata can be described as widely held 
                                                          
35 Compare id. at 857–58 (discussing a study conducted by presenting the 
subjects with various slides depicting static faces), with SMITH & MALANDRO, 
supra note 2, § 1.12, at 22 (noting that “[m]ost of the time jurors are 
watching what is referred to as ‘static’ facial behavior in the courtroom”).  
36 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329–30 (1991) (describing a 
sample study of Philadelphia felony defendants that revealed that only half of 
criminal defendants took the stand); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and 
Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death 
Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1998) (finding that “most 
defendants [in California capital jury trials] did not testify”). But see HARRY 
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146–48 (1966) (finding 
that the percentage of defendants who testify depends on the defendants’ prior 
records and the amount of evidence against the defendants).  
37 See Janik et al., supra note 32, at 858 (concluding that the study does 
not determine the extent to which a subject’s primary focus would change due 
to a person’s eye and mouth movements during prolonged inspection by the 
subject).  
38 Jellesma, supra note 20, at 2. 
39 K.A. Quinn & C.N. Macrae, Categorizing Others: The Dynamics of 
Person Construal, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 467, 476 (2005). 
40 Id. at 467.  
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social stereotypes.41 Character traits are associated with 
schemata, and, when one schema is activated, “the associated 
traits are attributed to the target person in the form of a first 
impression.”42 Eyeglasses greatly impact both the perception and 
recognition of others because they frame the eyes and make 
more distinct the facial region found to receive the most notable 
fixation.43  
Numerous studies demonstrate that a perceived correlation 
between wearing eyeglasses and heightened intelligence develops 
in early childhood and continues to strengthen with age. This 
perception also exists among children who wear eyeglasses 
themselves, suggesting that some children, through their own 
experiences, might learn to associate myopia with intelligence.44 
Sarah Sandow, Reader in Education at the West London 
Institute, conducted a study revealing that children as young as 
eight years old draw a connection between wearing eyeglasses 
and possessing intelligence.45 Children ages eight to ten 
consistently drew a “very clever” person with eyeglasses but did 
not do the same for stupid or nasty people.46 Hannu Räty and 
Leila Snellman, professors at the University of Joensuu in 
Finland, led a similar study that asked children to draw an 
“intelligent” person and found that children consistently drew 
eyeglasses in their images.47 However, when asked to draw an 
                                                          
41 Roger L. Terry & John H. Krantz, Dimensions of Trait Attributions 
Associated with Eyeglasses, Men’s Facial Hair, and Women’s Hair Length, 
23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1757, 1757 (1993). 
42 Id.  
43 Leder et al., supra note 24, at 221.  
44 Jeffrey J. Walline et al., What Do Kids Think About Kids in 
Eyeglasses?, 28 OPHTHALMIC & PHYSIOLOGICAL OPTICS 218, 223 (2008) 
(noting that another origin of children’s development of the stereotype that 
wearing eyeglasses equates to higher intelligence could be the media’s 
depictions of “intelligent-nerds”). 
45 See Sarah Sandow, The Good King Dagobert, or Clever, Stupid, Nice, 
Nasty, 12 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 83, 86–91 (1997) (commenting that “[i]t was 
fascinating that the wearing of glasses has survived as a stereotype for 
cleverness” and that “spectacles lend an air of dignity and bookishness, and 
the wearers are cool and confident”). 
46 Id. at 91–92.  
47 Hannu Räty & Leila Snellman, Children’s Images of an Intelligent 
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“ordinary” person, children rarely sketched a person with 
eyeglasses.48 David Chambers, Director of the Sciences in 
Society Centre at Deakin University, developed the well-known 
Draw-a-Scientist-Test (“DAST”), designed to determine when 
children develop stereotypical images of a scientist (“a man of 
knowledge”).49 Chambers’ test was administered over an eleven-
year period to nearly 5,000 children and found that the 
association between scientists and eyeglasses continues to 
increase with age.50 When Mark Thomas, a doctoral student in 
the Department of Psychology at Mississippi State University, 
administered a modified DAST to college-aged students (with a 
mean age of roughly twenty-one years), it revealed that the 
stereotype of eyeglasses correlating to higher intelligence does 
not fade with age: the drawings depicted a scientist with 
eyeglasses nearly seventy percent of the time.51  
                                                          
Person, 12 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 773, 778 (1997) (noting that 
older children depicted eyeglasses more frequently than younger children and 
that “eyeglasses are an almost archetypal sign of a ‘bookworm,’ a person 
absorbed in mental activity”); see also Hannu Räty & Leila Snellman, On the 
Social Fabric of Intelligence, 4 PAPERS ON SOC. REPRESENTATIONS 1, 2–3 
(1995) (concluding that “children have captured some central value-bound 
ideas of intelligence prevalent in our culture well before being capable of 
understanding them conceptually”). 
48 Räty & Snellman, Children’s Images of an Intelligent Person, supra 
note 47, at 778. 
49 David Wade Chambers, Stereotypic Images of the Scientist: The Draw-
a-Scientist Test, 67 SCI. EDUC. 255, 256–58 (1983) (noting that eyeglasses 
are associated with eyestrain and therefore are associated with acute 
observation). In Chambers’ study, each drawing was analyzed for seven 
predetermined indicators of a scientist: lab coat, eyeglasses, growth of facial 
hair, symbols of research, symbols of knowledge, technology (products of 
science), and relevant captions. Id.; see also Räty & Snellman, Children’s 
Images of an Intelligent Person, supra note 47, at 781 (noting significant 
overlap between the results of the Children’s Images of an Intelligent Person 
study and Chambers’ DAST results of children’s portrayals of the scientist as 
“a man of knowledge”). 
50 Chambers, supra note 49, at 257–58 (reporting that the number of 
indicators in children’s standard images of a scientist increased from fourteen 
in kindergarten-age children to 1,524 in fifth-grade-aged children). 
51 Mark D. Thomas et al., The Draw a Scientist Test: A Different 
Population and a Somewhat Different Story, 40 C. STUDENT J. 140, 144 
(2006). 
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The following studies indicate that perceptions and judgments 
of those who wear eyeglasses permeate cultural, gendered, and 
racial divides. As far back as 1944, G.R. Thornton, a professor 
in the Department of Psychology at Purdue University, found 
that people who wear eyeglasses are judged as being more 
intelligent, more industrious, more honest, and more dependable 
than those who do not wear eyeglasses.52 A subsequent cross-
cultural study conducted twenty-five years later paralleled 
Thornton’s findings.53 A study led by Åke Hellström, professor 
in the Department of Psychology at Stockholm University, 
conducted a facial attributes rating analysis that directly linked 
the wearing of eyeglasses with professionalism and intellect.54 
Specifically, this study revealed a strong perceived correlation 
between the wearing of eyeglasses and both prestigious 
occupations and positive character traits.55 In 1991, a gender-
based study on stereotypes associated with eyeglasses found that 
both men and women who wear eyeglasses are perceived as 
                                                          
52 G.R. Thornton, The Effect of Wearing Glasses upon Judgments of 
Personality Traits of Persons Seen Briefly, 28 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 203, 203 
(1944). Subjects wearing eyeglasses and judged via photographic slides were 
rated as more intelligent, more industrious, more honest, and more 
dependable. Id. However, subjects wearing eyeglasses and judged in person 
were rated as more intelligent and more industrious, but not necessarily as 
more honest. Id. at 207. When judged only by photographs, the subjects’ 
dress, demeanor, and overall appearance were excluded, supporting the 
proposition that a person’s demeanor is also taken into account when 
personality traits are judged. Id.; see also G.R. Thornton, The Effect upon 
Judgments of Personality Traits of Varying a Single Factor in a Photograph, 
18 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 127 (1943).  
53 Manz & Lueck, supra note 21, at 704 (replicating Thornton’s study 
with German students 25 years later, with subjects in photographs wearing 
eyeglasses producing higher ratings than subjects not wearing eyeglasses in 
the categories of intelligence, industriousness, dependability, and honesty).  
54 Hellström & Tekle, supra note 20, at 694.  
55 Hellström and Tekle’s study found that wearing eyeglasses positively 
correlates to the occupations of physician, lawyer, professor, engineer, 
pastor, politician, psychologist, and bank clerk, and positively correlates to 
judged character attributes of trustworthiness, helpfulness, and intelligence. 
Id. at 699. However, the study found that wearing eyeglasses negatively 
correlates to the occupations of factory worker, colonel, farmer, and 
salesman, and to the character attributes of masculinity and being suspect. Id.  
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being more intelligent, well-educated, well-read, and better 
employed.56 In 1993, a study examining the effects of eyeglasses 
and gender on perceived social forcefulness and mental 
competence confirmed that, overall, both men and women who 
wear eyeglasses are judged as having decreased forcefulness and 
heightened mental capacity.57 However, this study found that 
eyeglasses tend to detract from social appeal more in women 
than in men.58 In 2011, a study found that faces depicted with 
eyeglasses were consistently judged to be significantly more 
successful, more trustworthy, and more intelligent than faces 
depicted without eyeglasses.59 Even details such as whether the 
eyeglasses worn are rimless or full-rimmed can have an impact 
on trustworthiness and facial recognition.60 An earlier study 
using African-American and Caucasian subjects analyzed the 
effects of wearing eyeglasses in a courtroom setting.61 Echoing 
the results of previous studies, researchers found a strong link 
between wearing eyeglasses and perceived intelligence and a 
correlation between perceived intelligence of a defendant and 
decreased likelihood of a juror to render a guilty verdict.62  
The perceived correlation between wearing eyeglasses and 
heightened intelligence may be the result of a “nerd stereotype” 
that is deeply rooted in one’s schemata, in one’s social 
                                                          
56 See Mary B. Harris, Sex Differences in Stereotypes of Spectacles, 21 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1659, 1674–75 (1991).  
57 Terry & Krantz, supra note 41, at 1757, 1765–66.  
58 Id. at 1759.  
59 Leder et al., supra note 24, at 218–19.  
60 Id. at 216–19 (noting that “faces without eyeglasses [are] judged to be 
less successful and less intelligent than faces with full-rim glasses or rimless 
glasses,” and observing that it takes longer to recognize faces with full-rim 
glasses than it does to recognize faces either without glasses or with rimless 
glasses). 
61 See Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (finding no significant difference in the 
number of guilty verdicts rendered against African-American defendants 
(forty-nine percent) and Caucasian defendants (fifty-one percent) and 
concluding that, overall, participants rendered “guilty” verdicts forty-four 
percent of the time against defendants who wore eyeglasses while rendering 
“guilty” verdicts fifty-six percent of the time against defendants who did not 
wear eyeglasses).  
62 Id.  
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experiences, and in the media’s portrayal of intelligent people.63 
Stereotypes about people who wear eyeglasses abound in popular 
culture—in Hollywood film characters,64 highly rated television 
series,65 best-selling novels,66 classic comic books,67 and, 
                                                          
63 Jellesma, supra note 20, at 2–5.  
64 In 1918, Harold Lloyd’s “Glasses Character” became the “persona for 
which he would ultimately be celebrated.” Maurizio Giammarco, Harold 
Lloyd: Horatio Alger in Straw Hat and Horn-Rims, in PLAYBILLS TO 
PHOTOPLAYS: STAGE PERFORMERS WHO PIONEERED THE TALKIES 1, 143–47 
(Brenda Loew ed., 2010). Lloyd’s eyeglasses marked him as “more gentle, 
kind, and clever in nature.” Id.; see also Annette M. D’Agostino, Harold 
Lloyd: The Glasses, SILENTS ARE GOLDEN (1998), http://www.silentsare 
golden.com/hlloydglassesarticle.html (quoting Harold Lloyd) (“There is more 
magic in a pair of horn-rimmed glasses than the opticians dream of, nor did I 
guess the half of it when I put them on in 1917.”). Later, the screwball 
comedy Bringing Up Baby portrayed David Huxley as a bespectacled 
paleontologist marked by horn-rimmed eyeglasses that were intended to 
function as the visual marker of his “nerd” persona. See Eddie Deezen, Why 
Do Nerds So Often Wear Glasses?, NEATORAMA (Jan. 11, 2012, 5:03 AM), 
http://www.neatorama.com/2012/01/11/why-do-nerds-so-often-wear-glasses/.  
65 Steve Urkel, a character on the popular television show Family 
Matters, was known for his nerd persona marked by thick-rimmed eyeglasses 
and suspenders. See Hannah Jones, “Urkel” Is Now a Verb—and a High-
School Fashion Don’t, TIME (Dec. 9, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/ 
12/09/urkel-is-now-a-verb-and-a-high-school-fashion-dont/#ixzz2KS3ABLYn. 
For a suggestion of the influence of Urkel’s eyeglasses on both American 
culture and the American legal system, see Bruce Carton, “Change of 
Appearance” Instruction Upheld in Case of Defendant Wearing Eyeglasses to 
Court, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://legalblog 
watch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2012/10/change-of-appearance-
instruction-upheld-in-case-of-defendant-wearing-hipster-glasses.html (“So in 
D.C. courts, at least, defendants wear their Urkel glasses at their own 
peril.”). 
66 In the popular Superman comic book, Clark Kent used eyeglasses to 
disguise himself as an astute reporter. See LES DANIELS, SUPERMAN: THE 
COMPLETE HISTORY (2004); see also Superman Sales Figures, COMICHRON 
(Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.comichron.com/titlespotlights/superman.html 
(documenting that, from 1960 to 1986, Superman sold an estimated 110–15 
million copies).  
67 The Harry Potter novels became a wildly successful global 
phenomenon that influenced millions of people. See SUSAN GUNELIUS, 
HARRY POTTER: THE STORY OF A GLOBAL BUSINESS PHENOMENON (2008); 
Guy Dammann, Harry Potter Breaks 400m in Sales, GUARDIAN (June 18, 
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recently, in the media’s coverage of professional athletes.68 The 
aforementioned studies, coupled with popular culture’s portrayal 
of intelligent people, demonstrate the significant impact of 
wearing eyeglasses on the development of judgments and 
perceptions of others.  
II. THE UNOFFICIAL ROLE OF APPEARANCE IN THE COURTROOM  
Physical appearance is intimately tied to stereotypes about a 
person’s character traits,69 and the triggering of stereotypes 
based on appearance does not fade in a courtroom setting.70 
                                                          
2008, 7:30 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/jun/18/ 
harrypotter.news (noting that Harry Potter book sales “have topped 400m 
worldwide”). In the novels, Harry is marked by his thick-rimmed eyeglasses 
and consistently outsmarts his nemeses. See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY 
POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 20 (1998). 
68 Harvard economist Roland Fryer suggests that professional athletes use 
eyeglasses to convey a message: a positive, but false, message that eyeglasses 
imbue the wearer with greater intelligence. See Stephen J. Dubner, Playing 
the Nerd Card: A New Marketplace Podcast, FREAKONOMICS (May 31, 2012, 
9:26 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/05/31/playing-the-nerd-card-
a-new-marketplace-podcast/. The “nerd” appearance is transforming the 
images of National Basketball Association (NBA) players, with eyeglasses 
intended to signify, “We’re much, much smarter than you think.” Sean 
Gregory, NBA Nerd Alert, TIME (May 14, 2012), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2113816-2,00.html; see 
also Matt Ufford, NBA Finals Fashion: Shut Up, Everyone Looks Fine, 
SBNATION (June 13, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/ 
nba/2012/6/13/3079618/nba-finals-fashion-fake-glasses (quoting Dwayne 
Wade) (stating that NBA players wear eyeglasses because “[i]t’s cool to be 
smart [and] educated”). 
69 SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, §1.48, at 86. 
70 A study conducted on the interplay between a defendant’s appearance 
and an evaluation of a defendant found that attractive females (long hair and 
cosmetics as opposed to short hair and no cosmetics) were more often given 
short-term imprisonment ratings rather than long-term imprisonment ratings. 
Angela S. Ahola et al., Is Justice Really Blind? Effects of Crime 
Descriptions, Defendant Gender and Appearance, and Legal Practitioner 
Gender on Sentences and Defendant Evaluations in a Mock Trial, 17 
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. AND LAW 304, 319–20 (2010). This study further 
noted that faces often trigger stereotypes, such that “[a] baby-faced defendant 
will be considered less likely to have committed an offence intentionally, and 
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While inferences drawn about a defendant’s character based on 
his or her appearance may not be entirely inaccurate,71 such 
inferences are arbitrarily drawn and difficult to verify.72 Thus, a 
jury is generally precluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence 
from taking into consideration a defendant’s character.73 
However, the physical appearance of a defendant still plays a 
substantive role at trial.74 In fact, a defendant’s physical 
appearance is of such vital importance to a trial that an entire 
industry has developed for the purpose of advising a defendant 
on his or her aesthetic appearance at trial.75  
A. Character Evidence—Evidence the Jury Can Consider 
Versus Evidence the Jury Does Consider 
The courtroom, comprised of individuals who fill specialized 
and particular roles,76 provides a dynamic platform for 
discovering the truth. The jury trial is a central component of 
the American adversarial system, its purpose being to sort 
                                                          
more likely to have committed an offence by negligence than a defendant 
with a mature face.” Id. at 312.  
71 Robert Agnew, Appearance and Delinquency, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 421, 
424, 429 (1984) (finding a positive correlation between delinquency rates and 
unattractive appearance and noting that unattractive people—premised on the 
appearance of physical traits, dress, and grooming—are perceived as having 
significantly less favorable characteristics than attractive people). 
72 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s notes (cautioning against 
the use of character evidence at trial because it raises questions of relevancy 
and proof).  
73 See id.  
74 See David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance 
Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 193, 209 
(1995); M.G. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of 
Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in 
a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. RES. PERSONALITY, 45, 45 (1974) (finding that 
physically attractive defendants were judged with less certainty of guilt and 
received milder punishments than unattractive defendants). 
75 See Paul, supra note 12 (observing that jury consultants, “often trained 
in both psychology and law,” advise defendants on what to wear and how to 
appear in the courtroom). 
76 These individuals include the judge, defendant(s), legal counsel, 
audience, and witness(es). 
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through competing positions in order to arrive at the truth.77 
However, jurors hinder the truth-seeking process when they 
consider evidence that is deemed inadmissible due to its 
prejudicial effects.78 Though not always irrelevant,79 character 
evidence that is used to prove that a defendant acted, in a 
specific instance, in conformity with a character trait is often so 
weakly probative of guilt that the prejudice of admitting such 
evidence is likely to substantially outweigh the evidence’s 
probative value.80 Character evidence is traditionally forbidden 
because evidence of a defendant’s particular character trait does 
not necessarily correlate to a defendant having “acted in 
                                                          
77 Strier, supra note 22, at 100 (“Arguably, the most compelling claim 
supporting the adversary system of trial court dispute resolution is that it is 
the best judicial system for truth-finding.”); see also Barbara A. Babcock, 
Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9 n.31 (1993) 
(noting that the Supreme Court "has recognized that the purpose of a trial is 
to sort truth from untruth"). 
78 See Michelle Pan, Strategy or Stratagem: The Use of Improper 
Psychological Tactics by Trial Attorneys to Persuade Jurors, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 259, 262 (2005); see also Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: 
A New Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1928–29 
(2012) (stating that “[l]egal historians have commonly understood courts to 
have developed the law of evidence to prevent jurors' ‘cognitive and 
decisional failings’ from impacting their solemn duty to find the truth,” but 
also noting that despite such laws, jurors are often unable to properly 
consider character evidence) (citing Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed 
Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 199 (2006)). 
79 A defendant’s appearance may become relevant evidence if it “forms 
the basis for identification.” Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The 
Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 577 n.19 (2008).  
80 Aviva A. Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character 
Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 669–70 (1998) (“Even 
assuming that such [character] evidence is reliable, a proposition which is 
itself open to doubt, character evidence can be invasive, unfair, and 
prejudicial.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 614 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that an instruction to introduce character evidence should be refused 
where character evidence is not “central or crucial”).  
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conformity with that trait or characteristic.”81 Nevertheless, a 
defendant’s physical appearance at trial, whether consciously or 
unconsciously acknowledged, significantly influences perception 
of the defendant’s character and can influence the outcome of a 
case.82 
Behind the decision to refrain from giving jurors a proper 
instruction about consideration of a defendant’s appearance at 
trial lie two incorrect assumptions: (1) jurors are unbiased83 and 
(2) jurors consider only relevant evidence at trial.84 However, 
jurors tend to favor defendants whom they find more relatable, 
regardless of the facts.85 If jurors do, in fact, follow a court’s 
                                                          
81 Orenstein, supra note 80, at 668.  
82 See Steven Fein et al., Hype and Suspicion: The Effects of Pretrial 
Publicity, Race, and Suspicion on Jurors’ Verdicts, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 487, 
488–89 (1997) (observing that one factor contributing to “prejudicial effects 
of nonevidentiary information” is a juror’s inability to block out an image or 
thought of the defendant); Ross, supra note 14, at 227, 232 (“[T]he perceived 
character of an accused affects the outcome of jury trials . . .”); see also 
Steven Shepard, Note, Should the Criminal Defendant Be Assigned a Seat in 
Court?, 115 YALE L.J. 2203, 2208 (2006) (“A defendant’s appearance 
matters to the jury and can affect the outcome of a trial.”). 
83 See HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ 
JUROR 101–02 (1995); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Tara 
Trask, a jury consultant with seventeen years of experience in litigation 
strategy, who observed that “jurors tend to assign credibility to those who fit 
the stereotypes they have”).  
84 THORNTON, supra note 83, at 101–02. Jurors operate as “detectives, 
assimilating important visual information to add to evidence,” even when the 
visual information is irrelevant to the facts of the case. SMITH & MALANDRO, 
supra note 2, § 1.50, at 90.  
85 E.H. SUTHERLAND & D.R. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 
442 (7th ed. 1966) (“The main work of a trial lawyer is to make a jury like 
his client, or, at least, to feel sympathy for him; facts regarding the crime are 
relatively unimportant.”); see also Douglas Keene, Tattoos: When Should You 
Clean Up Your Witness?, KEENE TRIAL CONSULTING (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://keenetrial.com/blog/2010/12/06/tattoos-when-should-you-clean-up-your-
witness/ (“The goal of the attorney presenting a witness is to help the jury 
see the witness as ‘kind of like me’ or ‘someone I can trust.’ Appearance is a 
part of that. If someone looks scary or unfamiliar, they are judged as less 
trustworthy and less believable. The goal is to help them be more ‘relatable,’ 
regardless of the facts.”); Melanie Tannenbaum, Casey’s Case: What 
Psychology Says About Anthony’s Acquittal, PSYSOCIETY (July 10, 2011), 
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cautionary instructions to consider only relevant evidence,86 then 
why do courts,87 jury consultants,88 and defense teams89 go to 
such lengths to alter a defendant’s appearance at trial? Such 
                                                          
http://psysociety.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/casey-anthony/ (“Overall, jurors 
are more likely to be lenient towards defendants that are similar to them in 
some meaningful way. For example, jurors are less likely to convict 
defendants if they are of the same gender or race, or if they come from a 
similar socioeconomic background.”); John Schwartz, Extreme Makeover: 
Criminal Court Edition, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/us/06tattoo.html (“‘It’s easier to give 
someone who looks like you a fair shake,’ said [defense attorney] Bjorn E. 
Brunvand.”).  
86 CTJNY § 3:2 (2012) (describing to the jury what kind of evidence 
may be considered during deliberations by stating that “[e]vidence consists of 
the sworn testimony elicited both on direct examination and cross-
examination, and redirect and recross, if any, plus any concessions made 
during the trial by counsel, and any exhibits received and marked in 
evidence”); see also FED-JI § 12:03 (6th ed. 2013) (“The evidence in this 
case consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses—regardless of who may 
have called them—all exhibits received in evidence—regardless of who may 
have produced them—all facts which may have been agreed to or stipulated 
and all facts and events which may have been judicially noticed.”); PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, § 1.01, 3–4 (2012) 
(explaining to the jury what is not evidence, which includes “[s]tatements, 
arguments, and questions by lawyers . . . [o]bjections to questions . . . 
[t]estimony that the court has excluded . . . [and] [a]nything [the jurors] may 
have seen, heard, or read outside the courtroom . . . .”).  
87 See, e.g., Neil Nagraj, Court Pays $150 a Day to Cover Neo-Nazi 
John Ditullio’s Tattoos During Murder Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 7, 
2009), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-12-07/news/17940784_1_neo-
nazi-compound-tattoos-extreme-makeover (describing a Florida court’s order 
that required the state to pay a cosmetologist $150 for each day of trial in an 
effort to cover the defendant’s facial tattoos (barbwire and teardrops) and 
neck tattoos (large swastikas and a vulgar phrase)).  
88 Literature on trial practice devotes significant portions to how to alter 
a defendant’s appearance in accordance with known juror perceptions and 
stereotypes. See generally SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, §§ 1.01–2.08.  
89 See, e.g., Ivy Bigbee, Fashioning a Defense: Casey Anthony’s 
Evolving Style, CRIM. REP. DAILY (Apr. 29, 2011), http://web. 
archive.org/web/20120520050256/http://blogs.discovery.com/criminal_report/
2011/04/fashioning-a-defense-casey-anthonys-evolving-style.html (noting that, 
due to her defense team, “Anthony’s courtroom appearances at hearings 
ironically have spoken volumes, without her uttering a single word”).  
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measures are taken because it is ingrained in American society 
to judge others based on physical appearance: 
We live in a society where people are bombarded with so 
much information each day that they have learned to use 
shortcut techniques to make decisions. One of these 
shortcut techniques is to judge people based on initial 
perceptions of their appearance, background, and 
behavior. Once we have made these initial decisions 
about an individual, all further communication is filtered 
though this arrived-at perception. If we decide a person 
“looks like a law student,” then we will proceed to treat 
that perception as if it were an actual fact. We will 
respond to the individual as though he actually was in 
law school; that is, we might assume that he is an 
intellectually capable, academically motivated, and 
career-oriented person. It makes little difference whether 
the initial perception is correct. People treat the 
perception as accurate and make decisions from this base 
of information.90 
Juries—composed of a cross-section of American society—
judge in this same way.91 Jurors tend to consider any artificial 
altering of a defendant’s physical appearance, including: 
eyeglasses,92 clothing style,93 clothing color,94 makeup,95 
                                                          
90 SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, §1.48, at 86. 
91 Levenson, supra note 79, at 576–77. 
92 See generally Brown, supra note 9, at 1 (finding that appliances that 
“alter the appearance of eyes—namely eyeglasses—may influence our 
perceptions of an individual who uses such devices”). 
93 SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.19, at 36–37 (“It is important 
to coach your client and witnesses with regard to personal appearance factors. 
Witnesses do not have a good understanding of how much their clothing can 
affect the total impact in the courtroom.”). Although clothing alone may not 
change perception, it takes only one juror to notice clothing details and to 
share them with others in order to have an impact on the decision-making 
process. Id. § 1.16, at 29.  
94 An industry has emerged, called “color consulting,” in which 
consultants advise defendants on what clothing and make-up to wear at trial. 
Black colors should not be worn by defendants on trial for murder because 
“the connotations associated with black tend to be consistent across cultures 
and are deeply embedded in our minds.” Id. § 1.28, at 55. Red is associated 
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jewelry,96 and hairstyle.97 Yet, unless given specific instruction, 
jurors might not know how to properly consider those judgments 
in relation to the facts of the case.98 
B. The Impact of the Defendant’s Appearance on Juror 
Perceptions 
As the following cases highlight, a defendant’s appearance, 
although generally inadmissible as evidence, can still impact 
jurors’ perceptions at trial. In Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme 
Court recognized the impact of a defendant’s appearance on 
                                                          
with “passion, violence, excitement, and blood,” and should not be worn by 
defendants. Id.  
95 W.J. McKeachie, Lipstick as a Determiner of First Impressions of 
Personality: An Experiment for the General Psychology Course, 36 J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 241, 242 (1952) (concluding from a study that women who wear 
lipstick are judged as being more frivolous, more conscientious, and having 
more overt interest in males).  
96 SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.23, at 44 (“Jewelry, to the 
juror-detective, offers many stereotypes which will affect the total perception 
of the individual.”). For a discussion of rings, see id. § 1.50, at 91 
(explaining that a ring worn on the ring finger indicates a stable relationship). 
For a discussion of defendants wearing watches to trial, see Martha Neil, 
Defendant Puts Best Face Forward, After Extreme Makeover, in Capital 
Murder Case, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 6, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/defendant_puts_best_face_forward_sans_most_tattoo
s_in_capital_murder_case/ (reporting that, in the Enron Trial, consultant 
Douglas Keene told his clients “to be sure they didn’t wear their $10,000 
watches to trial”).  
97 See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.24, at 50 (“Hair that is 
curly will make the person appear energetic. For the perception of credibility, 
the hair should be short, tailored, and professional.”). 
98 The jury may be instructed on how to specifically consider a 
defendant’s appearance at trial when the defendant’s appearance is relevant, 
such as when the defendant’s identification is at issue. See MULDOON, supra 
note 16, § 9:262 (stating that “[w]ith the time lag between the occurrence of 
the crime and the trial, the defendant’s appearance may change, whether with 
time, fashions or because of an attempt at disguise for trial” and “[t]he 
defendant’s appearance at the time of the crime is relevant for purposes of 
identification”); see also Joseph v. State, 642 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (noting that the trial court had the authority to instruct jurors on 
how to properly consider religious dress in the courtroom).  
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juries.99 The Court found that forcing a defendant to wear prison 
attire before a jury infringed upon his or her Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights.100 A defendant clothed in an 
orange jumpsuit at trial can give the jury the impression that the 
defendant is more likely to have committed the crime, something 
the Court deemed inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence in the American justice system.101 Even though the 
character evidence derived from the defendant’s appearance was 
inadmissible, the Court recognized the likely prejudicial effect of 
the defendant’s clothing on the jury.102 The Court concluded that 
jurors, at least in some instances, are unable to ignore a 
defendant’s appearance.103 
In 2010, a Florida judge recognized the likelihood of a 
defendant’s appearance impacting the jury.104 John Ditullio faced 
the death penalty for charges related to the violent stabbing and 
death of a teenager but ultimately received life in prison without 
the possibility of parole.105 Ditullio’s defense team successfully 
argued that his neo-Nazi tattoos—although acquired after his 
arrest—would be too distracting and too prejudicial for the 
                                                          
99 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976) (“The defendant’s 
clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that, not 
unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also 
witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of 
impermissible factors coming into play.”). 
100 Id. at 512–13.  
101 Id. at 503 (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in 
the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of 
criminal justice.”); see also THORNTON, supra note 83, at 111–12 
(supporting the proposition that a defendant who wears prison attire is more 
likely to be convicted); Shepard, supra note 82, at 2208.  
102 Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505. 
103 Id. at 518 (finding that prison attire “surely tends to brand [the 
defendant] in the eyes of the jurors with an unmistakable mark of guilt”). 
104 State v. Ditullio, No. CRC06-05827CFAWS (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009); see 
also Schwartz, supra note 85.  
105 Carlin DeGuerin Miller, John Allen Ditullio Guilty Verdict: Neo-Nazi 
Convicted of Murder, Sentenced to Life in Prison, CBS NEWS (Dec. 17, 
2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20026011-
504083.html. 
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jurors to see.106 Alternatively, Alan Dershowitz, a criminal 
defense attorney and Harvard Law School professor, suggested 
that “the swastika and other tattoos [were] an extension of 
Ditullio’s persona, and masking the marks could be construed as 
misleading to a jury.”107 Nonetheless, the court agreed with 
Ditullio’s defense attorney that unless Ditullio’s neo-Nazi tattoos 
were covered, his physical appearance could prejudice the 
jury.108 Ditullio’s tattoos may have suggested to the jury that he 
had unfavorable characteristics—essentially, that embodied in 
Ditullio’s persona was an outwardly racist and hateful being.109 
In one of the most publicized capital murder trials in 
history,110 Casey Anthony’s defense team strategically selected 
preppy clothing to project a childish and innocent image.111 
                                                          
106 Schwartz, supra note 85 (reporting that Ditullio’s lawyer argued for 
his client’s tattoos to be covered up because “[t]here’s no doubt in my mind 
without the makeup being used, there’s no way a jury could look at John and 
judge him fairly”). Ditullio’s second trial was widely discussed because of 
the court’s decision to have the state pay for his neo-Nazi tattoos to be 
covered at trial. Id.  
107 Cindy E. Rodriguez, Neo-Nazi Accused of Hate-Crime Murder Gets 
Make-over, ABC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/neo-nazi-
accused-hate-crime-murder-makeover/story?id=12324409#.UIXSiUKRrww. 
108 Ditullio, No. CRC06-05827CFAWS; see also K. McKinney, 
Brunvand Wins Motion to Have Murder Defendant’s Tattoos Covered During 
Trial, ACQUITTER.COM (Dec. 7, 2009), http://acquitter.com/news/florida/ 
brunvand-wins-motion-cover-tattoos/. 
109 Greg Wims, the President of the Victims’ Rights Foundation, stated, 
“People should be able to see these tattoos. The jury should see what kind of 
person he is. Of course those tattoos are central to the case.” Rodriguez, 
supra note 107; see Ryan Lozar, Tattoos as Evidence, CALIFORNIA LAWYER 
57–58 (2012) (explaining that snap judgments about a defendant’s character 
that are based on physical appearance are especially severe when the 
defendant has a tattoo, and noting that depending on the subject of the tattoo, 
the defendant may be perceived as “seedy, provocative, or downright 
dangerous”).  
110 State v. Anthony, No. 48-2008-CF-015606-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011); 
see also State of Florida v. Casey Marie Anthony, NINTH JUD. CIRCUIT CT. 
FLA., http://www.ninthcircuit.org/news/High-Profile-Cases/Anthony/ (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2013) (highlighting the court’s media policies).  
111 See Bigbee, supra note 89 (describing a change in Casey Anthony’s 
courtroom attire from “stylish in a sexually-suggestive way” to “a modest, 
plaid shirt under a drab gray cardigan sweater”). Casey Anthony was accused 
748 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Anthony’s appearance evolved throughout the trial: from 
oversized112 and pastel-colored shirts113 to preppy sweaters and 
long hair.114 Anthony’s defense team crafted a story about her 
                                                          
of murdering her two-year-old daughter, Caylee Anthony, but the jury 
acquitted her of first-degree murder. Michael Winter, Casey Anthony 
Acquitted of Murder, USA TODAY (July 5, 2011), 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/07/casey-
anthony-jury-reaches-verdict/1. In the infamous case of the Menendez 
brothers, the defendants used a similar preppy look. The brothers were 
convicted of violently murdering their parents. Throughout their trial, the 
brothers donned preppy sweaters. Although the jurors acknowledged that the 
defendants’ appearance was not admissible evidence, they still “discussed the 
fact that the defendants wore sweaters as opposed to suits to court.” 
THORNTON, supra note 83, at 111; see also Dominick Dunne, The Menendez 
Murder Trial, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 1993), http://www.vanityfair.com/ 
magazine/archive/1993/10/dunne199310 (reporting that the Menendez 
brothers’ “Armani-type clothes [were] replaced in the courtroom by sensible 
shirts, slacks, and sweaters, brought freshly washed and ironed each morning 
for them to change into from the L.A. County Jail uniforms they [were] 
wearing when they arrive[d] at court”). 
112 Casey’s Appearance Could Be Changed to Influence Jury, (Apr. 7, 
2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.wftv.com/news/news/caseys-appearance-could-
be-changed-to-influence-ju/nK99f/ (describing Anthony’s clothes as “baggy 
and disheveled” and noting that she transformed her image to fit a “librarian 
look” and donned clothing that matched her defense team’s attire); SMITH & 
MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.19, at 36 (“To create a victimized look or a 
look of helplessness, the individual should wear oversized clothing . . . . ”). 
One explanation for matching attire might be the proximity between Anthony 
and one of her female attorneys. If there is a stark difference in dress 
between attorney and client, any images will be perceived as “more 
extreme.” Id. at 35. 
113 Compare Lillian Glass, Jose Baez and Casey Anthony’s Body 
Language Show Delight in Jurors’ Negative Reactions Towards Nancy Grace, 
Casey’s Courtroom Tension Builds on Day 6, DR. LILLIAN GLASS BODY 
LANGUAGE BLOG, (May 15, 2011), http://drlillianglassbodylanguageblog. 
wordpress.com/2011/05/15/jose-baez-and-casey-anthonys-body-language-show 
-delight-in-jurors-negative-reactions-towards-nancy-grace-caseys-courtroom-
tension-builds-on-day-6/ (depicting Casey Anthony’s use of pastel-colored and 
ruffled clothing at trial), with SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.19, at 
36 (“To create a submissive look for a woman, pastels and ruffles should be 
worn.”). 
114 See Jessica Hopper & Ashleigh Banfield, Casey Anthony Trial: 
Defense Team Claims Caylee Anthony Drowned in Family Pool, ABC NEWS, 
(May 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey_anthony_trial/casey-
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character through her appearance that suggested that Anthony 
was a child-like woman “forever stuck in adolescence.”115 
Perhaps to the jurors, Anthony appeared as a woman incapable 
of having committed the brutal crime of which she was accused. 
The court did not consider Anthony’s appearance to be relevant 
admissible evidence, yet legal analysts suggested that the defense 
counsel attempted to “subtly influence the judge” by altering 
Anthony’s appearance.116 It follows that what may subtly 
influence the judge may also influence the jury.117 At the trial’s 
conclusion, the jury acquitted Anthony of the capital murder 
charge.118 As these cases highlight, the Supreme Court, defense 
attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, and law professors all 
recognize that a defendant’s appearance has the potential to 
encourage certain biases in jurors.  
III. THE NERD DEFENSE 
Since eyeglasses can drastically change one’s appearance, 
they are a particularly powerful tool with which to alter juror 
perceptions.119 A defendant who wears eyeglasses to trial without 
any need to correct vision impairment utilizes the nerd defense 
                                                          
anthony-trial-defense-claims-caylee-anthony-drowned/story?id=13674375; see 
also SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.24, at 48 (noting that to help 
portray a soft and submissive look in the courtroom, a client’s hair should be 
longer).  
115 Bigbee, supra note 89.  
116 Casey’s Appearance Could Be Changed to Influence Jury, supra note 
112.  
117 Judges are more likely than jurors to notice defense teams’ strategies 
because judges are trained to examine the law and are attuned to the 
strategies that defense teams employ. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. 
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 126 (1988) (discussing the argument against jury trials by 
acknowledging that judges and lawyers are “courtroom veterans” as 
compared to the jury).  
118 Winter, supra note 111.  
119 See Tom Davies, Framed! Sharon Osbourne, OPTICIAN ONLINE (Nov. 
18, 2005), http://www.opticianonline.net/Articles/2005/11/18/14675/Framed! 
+Sharon+Osbourne.htm (stating that eyeglasses can cause the ugly to 
“become cool” and the cool to “become intelligent”).  
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in the hopes of appearing more intelligent120 and therefore less 
likely to have committed a crime.121 Juries are less likely to 
convict defendants whom they find more “likeable,”122 and 
studies show that wearing eyeglasses helps to make a defendant 
appear more likeable.123 Wearing nonprescriptive eyeglasses 
fabricates a defect in a defendant and plays upon one of 
society’s most deeply rooted stereotypes: that glasses are 
synonymous with higher intelligence.124 In this sense, wearing 
nonprescriptive eyewear is analogous to using crutches or a 
wheelchair despite lacking a physical injury.125 By contrast, 
dressing a defendant in a suit and tie, adding accessories (e.g., 
watches and rings), altering hairstyle, or applying makeup can 
affect juror perception, but such changes do not falsely represent 
a handicap or a physical defect.126 Similarly, a defendant who 
                                                          
120 Alexander, supra note 9; see also Brown, supra note 9, at 1.  
121 Brown, supra note 9, at 3; see also Rita Handrich, The Glasses 
Create a Kind of Unspoken Nerd Defense, KEENE TRIAL CONSULTING (Mar. 
7, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://keenetrial.com/blog/2011/03/07/the-glasses-create-
a-kind-of-unspoken-nerd-defense (“The idea that the Nerd Defense might 
work (or help) is an extension of the fact that Nerds are evidently viewed as 
being less likely to commit crimes . . . . If they create an image of someone 
who ‘doesn’t look like they would do that sort of thing,’ it will aid in the 
defense.”). 
122 SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, supra note 85, at 442. However, 
attractiveness is also a component of likability, and glasses are perceived as 
making the wearer less attractive. Terry & Krantz, supra note 41, at 1766 
(noting that the “negative” perceptions of those who wear eyeglasses lead to 
“increas[ed] ratings of character, compassion, honesty, and sensitivity [and] 
decreas[ed] ratings of attractiveness [and forcefulness]”); see generally Leder 
et al., supra note 24 (connecting the wearing of eyeglasses with increased 
intelligence and decreased attractiveness).  
123 See, e.g., SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.21 at 42 (noting 
that wide lenses help to create an open-eyed look that is associated with traits 
of trustworthiness, likability, and innocence).  
124 Thornton, The Effect of Wearing Glasses upon Judgments of 
Personality Traits of Persons Seen Briefly, supra note 52, at 203; Brown, 
supra note 9, at 3. 
125 See Marshall, supra note 18 (“Glasses convey information about 
physical capabilities the same way coming into court on crutches or in a 
wheelchair does.”). 
126 Id. (contrasting use of fake eyewear with “haircut, a shave, a suit and 
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chooses to wear contacts rather than eyeglasses to trial has not 
falsely represented a handicap. The real problem lies in 
concocting a handicap that brings with it such powerful social 
stereotypes. Richard Waites, the Chief Executive of a jury 
consulting firm, observes that “[j]urors expect to see defendants 
wearing [nice shirts and ties],” but “[j]urors don’t expect to see 
defendants wearing glasses if they don’t have to.”127 Eyeglasses 
are now one of the world’s most popular fashion accessories,128 
viewed as possessing the unique power to “transform you like 
no other accessory.”129 Defense attorneys have taken note of this 
pop-culture trend and are increasingly employing the nerd 
defense as a courtroom tactic.130 
A. Studies Concerning the Effect of Eyeglasses on Jurors’ 
Perceptions 
In one analysis of a study conducted in 2008, psychologist 
Michael J. Brown examined the social-cognitive processes 
involved when individuals make decisions, attributions, and 
judgments.131 In Brown’s study, 220 students were presented 
with a portfolio containing the vignette of a fictitious trial 
involving a violent crime, the defendant’s photograph and 
physical description, and a survey asking the reader to render a 
                                                          
shined shoes,” which are not deceptive). Although eyeglasses are being 
increasingly worn as fashion accessories, their original purpose was to correct 
for an eye defect. Leder et al., supra note 24, at 211 (“The primary use of 
eyeglasses is their ability to correct congenital or acquired vision deficits such 
as myopia, presbyopia, or astigmatism.”). 
127 Alexander, supra note 9.  
128 Leder et al., supra note 24, at 211; Joel Stein, The TIME 100 Most 
Influential Things in the World, TIME (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2066367_206658
4_2066602-3,00.html (ranking “nerd glasses” as the 74th most influential 
thing in the world). 
129 Davies, supra note 119.  
130 Tillman, supra note 5; Debra Cassens Weiss, Instruction on Slaying 
Defendant’s New Eyeglasses at Issue on Appeal, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 14, 2012, 
8:52 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/instruction_on_slaying_ 
defendants_new_eyeglasses_at_issue_on_appeal/. 
131 Brown, supra note 9, at 1.  
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verdict and to rate the defendant as either “more” or “less” 
physically threatening, intelligent, attractive, and friendly.132 The 
portfolio included the defendant’s photograph in one of four 
possible combinations: male Caucasian wearing eyeglasses; male 
Caucasian not wearing eyeglasses; African American wearing 
eyeglasses; or African American not wearing eyeglasses.133 In 
this study, participants rendered a “guilty” verdict only forty-
four percent of the time against defendants who wore eyeglasses, 
while defendants who did not wear eyeglasses were found 
“guilty” fifty-six percent of the time.134 The study found no 
significant difference between the verdicts for Caucasian 
defendants and the verdicts for African-American defendants.135  
Brown’s follow-up study, using the same general format and 
method noted above, examined the effect of eyeglasses in a 
white-collar crime context.136 Consistent with the previous study, 
defendants who wore eyeglasses were rated as being more 
intelligent.137 However, increased ratings of intelligence 
positively correlated with an increased number of guilty 
verdicts. In Brown’s presentation of a white-collar crime, 
eyeglasses had a “detrimental indirect effect” on a defendant by 
making the defendant appear more intelligent.138 Brown’s studies 
did not definitively conclude that wearing eyeglasses equates to 
                                                          
132 Id. at 3. 
133 Id. (using models comparable in age, weight, hair color, hair length, 
eye size, and facial hair, and wearing the same eyeglasses in each 
photograph). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. (concluding that Caucasians received guilty verdicts fifty-one 
percent of the time, while African Americans received guilty verdicts forty-
nine percent of the time). Although there was not a significant difference in 
verdicts based on race, “race was a significant predictor of several perceived 
defendant characteristics.” Id. When both race and eyeglasses were taken into 
account, African Americans were perceived as more attractive and more 
friendly, while Caucasians were perceived as less attractive and less friendly. 
Moreover, African-American defendants wearing eyeglasses were perceived 
as less physically threatening than Caucasian defendants wearing eyeglasses. 
Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 3–4.  
138 Id. at 3.  
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either a “not guilty” verdict or a “guilty” verdict.139 Rather, 
these studies found that wearing eyeglasses has a significant 
indirect effect on verdict outcome.140 This is because wearing 
eyeglasses relates to increased ratings of intelligence, and 
perceived intelligence positively affects jurors’ verdicts in 
violent-crime scenarios and negatively affects jurors’ verdicts in 
white-collar-crime scenarios.141 While these studies merely 
scratch the surface of the effect of eyeglasses on juror 
perception, they lend support to the premise that jurors do not 
relinquish their biases concerning eyewear in a courtroom 
setting.142 
Research shows that jurors discriminate on the basis of 
appearance,143 race,144 and gender.145 To compensate for juror 
biases,146 defendants are urged to appear before the court well 
groomed and in business-type attire.147 Are unnecessary 
eyeglasses simply another means to offset negative juror biases? 
Wearing unnecessary eyeglasses, like wearing proper courtroom 
                                                          
139 Id. at 4.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2–4. 
142 Id. at 3–4, 6 (including a response from Tara Trask, a jury consultant 
with 17 years of experience in litigation strategy, who stated, “I have seen 
jurors tend to assign credibility to those who fit the stereotypes they have”).  
143 Efran, supra note 74, at 45–54.  
144 See Fein et al., supra note 82, at 491 (indicating that “research has 
found that a jury’s racial composition . . . can have a significant effect on the 
verdict that jury reaches”); see also Wiley, supra note 74, at 214 (noting that 
“it is easier for jurors to imagine themselves in the defendant’s situation 
when the defendant is of the same race as the juror”).  
145 Ahola et al., supra note 70, at 321 (finding that “[i]n the courtroom 
situation, the defendant will be judged more severely by a judge or jurors of 
the same gender as the defendant him/herself; being sentenced by a judge of 
the opposite sex will be to the advantage of the defendant”). 
146 See THORNTON, supra note 83, at 103–08 (noting that the legal 
system acknowledges that jurors “bring to any new experience all past 
experiences and attitudes,” but that “it is not always possible to recognize 
those biases and eliminate those jurors” through the jury selection process).  
147 Mark J. Sullivan, A Defendant’s Guide to Courtroom Etiquette, 
CRIME, JUST. & AM. 34, 35 (2001) (suggesting to criminal defendants that 
jurors should, at first impression, be unable to discern through dress who is 
the defendant and who is the attorney).  
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attire, portrays favorable characteristics to the jury.148 However, 
by analogy, a defendant who seeks to offset juror bias might 
utilize a multitude of props (such as unnecessary crutches or 
neck braces) that are designed to manipulate the jury and elicit 
misplaced sympathy and favorable judgment. Wearing proper 
courtroom attire does not fabricate a defect in any way. 
However, wearing unnecessary eyeglasses to trial is akin to 
telling the jury a lie without consequence. Such behavior 
undermines a judicial system that is designed to arrive at the 
truth.149 
B. Reception of the Nerd Defense in Criminal Trials 
Strong opinions abound about a defendant’s use of 
unnecessary eyeglasses at trial.150 The use of nonprescriptive 
eyewear by defendants is becoming increasingly popular, with 
inmates strategically swapping eyeglasses before hearings, 
friends and family delivering eyeglasses during visits to inmates, 
and lawyers supplying clients with eyeglasses.151 The nerd 
defense has received significant media attention, with 
commentators both endorsing and criticizing the use of 
                                                          
148 See id. (noting that formal dress for defendants in the courtroom leads 
jurors to believe that the defendant is serious and leads judges to believe that 
defendants have respect for the courtroom); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 
2–4.  
149 See Anderson, supra note 78, at 1928 (stating that the jury has a 
“solemn duty to find the truth”). 
150 Kevin Deutsch, Defense Lawyers Swear by Gimmick of Having 
Defendants Wearing Glasses at Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2011), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-02-13/news/28613008_1 (“If a jury 
thinks the defendant looks incapable of a brutal crime, then it’s certainly an 
advantage for the defense . . . . The glasses create a kind of unspoken nerd 
defense.”); Marshall, supra note 18 (“If glasses made a guy like Larry Davis 
look gentle, they can work for anybody . . . . I always tell clients to get a 
pair. The nerdier the better.”); Alexander, supra note 9 (noting that “[o]ften 
times it’s about perception, and glasses help with that perception” and 
“[eyeglasses are] masks . . . [t]hey’re designed to confuse the witness and 
influence the jury”); Weiss, supra note 130 (quoting Harvey Slovis, who 
stated that “I’ve tried cases where there’s been a tremendous amount of 
evidence, but my client wore glasses, dressed well and got acquitted”). 
151 Alexander, supra note 9. 
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nonprescriptive eyewear by defendants in a courtroom setting.152 
The following cases provide examples of the utilization of the 
nerd defense in criminal trials.  
In the infamous case of People v. Davis, a twenty-one-year-
old defendant was charged with the attempted murder of nine 
police officers as they sought to arrest him.153 During a lengthy 
trial period, the prosecution used police testimony to portray 
Larry Davis, the defendant, as a “gold chain-clad thug.”154 The 
defense countered by altering Davis’ appearance, giving him a 
clean-cut look and a pair of horn-rimmed eyeglasses155 to make 
him “look like Mr. Peepers.”156 In a trial that spanned seven 
months, Davis was acquitted of the attempted murder of the 
officers.157 
In 2011, a Bronx jury acquitted Thomas Cordero, known as 
“[the] nude housekeeper,” on charges of stabbing John Conley 
to death.158 On the advice of his lawyer, Harvey Slovis, Cordero 
donned eyeglasses throughout the trial.159 Despite Cordero’s 
                                                          
152 See Marshall, supra note 18 (raising concerns about whether putting 
nonprescriptive eyeglasses on a defendant with 20-20 eyesight rises to the 
level of deceit prohibited by New York Legal Ethics Rule 8.4); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002); John Pertzborn, Chet 
Pleban: Nerd Defense in the Courtroom, FOX2NOW ST. LOUIS (Apr. 2, 
2012, 8:18 AM), http://fox2now.com/2012/04/02/chet-pleban-nerd-defense-
in-the-courtroom/.  
153 People v. Davis, 537 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1988).  
154 Deutsch, supra note 150. 
155 See id. (observing that at trial, Davis resembled a studious young 
adult “dressed like a college student, sporting horn-rimmed glasses and 
sweaters”). 
156 Marshall, supra note 18. 
157 See William G. Blair, Jury in Bronx Acquits Larry Davis in Shooting 
of Six Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/21/nyregion/jury-in-bronx-acquits-larry-
davis-in-shooting-of-six-police-officers.html.  
158 Kevin Deutsch & Bill Hutchinson, “Nude Housekeeper” Acquitted of 
Stabbing Client to Death Despite DNA Evidence, Confession, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-
13/news/27087260_1_dna-evidence-confession-thomas-cordero. 
159 Deutsch, supra note 150; see also Hannah Rand, The “Nerd 
Defense”: How Violent Criminals Are Turning to Thick-Framed Hipster 
Glasses to Persuade Juries They Are “More Intelligent, More Honest,” MAIL 
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confession and the admission of DNA evidence linking him to 
the murder, Cordero was acquitted.160 Cordero “ditched [the 
eyeglasses] the moment he was free.”161 
In perhaps the most publicized use of the nerd defense thus 
far, five young men went on trial in Washington, D.C. in 2010 
for first degree murder committed during “one of the District’s 
deadliest outbreaks of violence.”162 Each of the defendants 
arrived to court wearing large-framed and heavy-rimmed 
glasses.163 This sparked the attention of the prosecution, 
prompting Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Brittin to ask his 
key witness if he had ever seen any of the men wearing 
eyeglasses prior to trial.164 In the dozens of hearings before the 
                                                          
ONLINE (Mar. 30, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2122990/The-nerd-defense-How-violent-criminals-turning-framed-hipster-
glasses-persuade-juries-intelligent-honest.html (reporting that defense attorney 
Harvey Slovis gives “all his defendants thick-rimmed, nonprescription glasses 
before court appearances to make them look less threatening”).  
160 Minara El-Rahman, Nude Housekeeper Not Guilty of Murder, 
FINDLAW (Jan. 21, 2011, 6:15 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/ 
2011/01/nude-housekeeper-not-guilty-of-murder.html (reporting that in a 
taped statement, Cordero confessed to police that John Conley attempted to 
rape him, at which time he took a knife from Conley and stabbed him, but 
that at trial Cordero stated that he wanted to recant his confession because 
“he was coerced by Detective Steven Berger”).  
161 Deutsch, supra note 150. 
162 Keith L. Alexander, Deliberations Begin in Five-Man District Murder 
Trial, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/deliberations-in-five-man-district-murder-
trial/2012/04/25/gIQAT15RhT_blog.html; see also South Capitol Street 
Murders: Sanquan Carter, Orlando Carter, Jeffrey Best, Robert Bost and 
Lamar Williams to be Sentenced, ABC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012 5:47 AM), 
http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/09/south-capitol-street-murders-sanquan-
carter-orlando-carter-jeffrey-best-robert-bost-and-lamar-willia.html.  
163 Alexander, supra note 9. 
164 The defendants’ identities were at issue in the case, allowing the 
prosecution to question two witnesses. Key witness Nathaniel Simms, who 
had previously pled guilty in the case, responded with an unequivocal “no” to 
U.S. Attorney Michael Brittin’s question concerning Orlando Carter’s use of 
eyewear prior to trial. The answer was the “same for each of Carter’s co-
defendants.” Id.; see also District of Columbia v. Carter, No. 2010 CF1 
005677 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012).  
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trial, only one defendant had donned eyeglasses.165 Prosecutors 
took advantage of the opportunity to suggest to jurors that the 
defendants were being “dishonest in misrepresenting their 
appearance.”166 All five defendants were found guilty.167 After 
the trial, one prosecutor suggested that the defendants were 
putting on a “schoolboy act.”168 Patricia Jefferies, grandmother 
of one of the victims, agreed, arguing that the defendants’ 
strategy was aimed at “influencing the jury, trying to make them 
think they’re Boy Scouts or something.”169 Together, these cases 
demonstrate the ease with which a defendant can add eyeglasses 
to his or her look to influence the jury. 
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF THE NERD DEFENSE AND THE 
CHANGE-OF-APPEARANCE INSTRUCTION 
A. Harris v. United States 
The case of Harris v. United States marks the first instance 
in which a defendant’s use of nonprescriptive eyewear at trial 
became an explicit issue on appeal.170 In July 2008, a jury for 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Donnell 
                                                          
165 See Benjamin R. Freed, Murder Defendants Try Wearing Hipster 
Glasses in Fashionable Attempt to Win Over Juries, DCIST (Mar. 27, 2012, 
4:15 PM), http://dcist.com/2012/03/defense_attorneys_try_giving_client.php 
(noting that Lamar Williams was the only defendant known to have ever 
worn eyeglasses before trial).  
166 Id.  
167 Five Men Convicted of Charges for Their Roles in Crimes That Led to 
Five Murders, Nine Other Shootings, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/news/2012/may/12-161.html (reporting that 
all five men were convicted of murder, conspiracy, and other charges related 
to violent crimes that culminated in the March 30, 2010 fatal shootings on 
South Capitol Street); see also Carter, No. 2010 CF1 005677; District of 
Columbia v. Carter, No. 2010 CF1 005176 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012); District 
of Columbia v. Best, No. 2010 CF1 007370 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012); District 
of Columbia v. Bost, No. 2010 CF1 007155 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012); District 
of Columbia v. Williams, No. 2010 CF1 007157 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012). 
168 Alexander, supra note 9. 
169 Freed, supra note 165. 
170 Harris v. United States, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
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Harris guilty of second degree murder for the fatal shooting of 
Michael Richardson.171 Soon after sentencing, Harris filed a 
notice of appeal with the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals.172 Harris’ use of eyewear, a “seemingly innocuous 
detail” during the trial, was a “key issue at the heart of [his] 
appeal.”173 On appeal, Chief Judge Eric Washington found 
Harris’ use of eyeglasses to be one of the case’s most 
compelling issues.174 Throughout trial, Harris consistently 
donned eyeglasses despite not having worn eyeglasses prior to 
trial.175 This prompted the prosecution to request a change-of-
appearance instruction, a request that the judge granted.176 
When a court issues a change-of-appearance instruction, the 
language used by the court can be damning to the defendant if 
the jury determines that the defendant has, in fact, changed his 
or her appearance.177 This is due to the inference of a 
                                                          
171 The government presented evidence that Harris entered Joe’s Steak 
and Egg Restaurant at approximately 2:00 AM on June 29, 2007. Harris 
asked to use the phone, and, when his request was denied, he left the 
restaurant. Harris subsequently reentered the restaurant, where witnesses saw 
him arguing with Richardson, an intern with the D.C. Public Defender 
Service. Some time later, multiple gunshots were fired, fatally wounding 
Richardson. Id. 
172 See Court Cases Online Database, D.C. CTS., 
https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (search 
for “Harris, Donnell”) (reporting that Harris first filed a notice of appeal on 
Oct. 21, 2008).  
173 Tillman, supra note 5. On appeal, Harris also argued that the trial 
court erred by (1) overruling the defendant’s objections to statements made 
during the prosecution’s closing argument, (2) excluding from jury 
instructions the defendant’s theory that someone else committed the murder, 
and (3) denying a motion for acquittal despite there being insufficient 
evidence against the defendant. See Brief of Appellant, Harris, No. 08-CF-
1405.   
174 Tillman, supra note 5.  
175 Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5.  
176 Id. at 6. 
177 Change-of-appearance instructions “contemplate[] some independent 
evidence” that the defendant is the one who actually changed his or her 
appearance. United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1991). 
For example, this occurs where a defendant, shortly after committing a 
crime, cuts or colors his or her hair or shaves his beard. Id.  
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defendant’s consciousness of guilt, which “flows from any 
change of appearance” instruction that is given to the jury.178 
Change-of-appearance instructions generally contain language 
that attributes to the defendant “consciousness of guilt” or “fear 
of being identified.”179 In Harris, the change-of-appearance 
instruction, issued as a result of the defendant’s sudden use of 
eyeglasses, raised questions as to whether the defendant’s rights 
had been prejudiced.180 Defense counsel asserted that the change-
of-appearance instruction is reserved for situations that “refer[] 
                                                          
178 Id.  
179 See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (“A defendant’s attempt to change his appearance after a crime has 
been committed does not create a presumption of guilt. An innocent person 
charged with a serious offense may resort to various means, both lawful and 
unlawful, to avoid prosecution. On the other hand, you may consider 
evidence of the defendant’s attempt to change his appearance as tending to 
prove the defendant’s fear of being identified and therefore his consciousness 
of guilt. You are not required to do so.” (emphasis added)); see also Perkins, 
937 F.2d at 1402 n.3 (discussing a defendant’s appeal of a conviction for 
bank robbery because the district court instructed the jury that “[a] 
defendant’s intentional change of his appearance immediately after the 
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been 
committed, is not, of course, sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but may 
be considered by the jury in the light of all other evidence in the case in 
determining guilt or innocence,” and noting that “[w]hether or not evidence 
of a change of appearance shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance 
to be attached to any evidence, are matters exclusively within the province of 
the jury” (emphasis added) (citing Devitt & Blackmar, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 15.08)).  
180 Trial Transcript at 87–88, United States v. Harris, No. CF1-18801-07 
(D.C. Super. Ct. 2008), reprinted in Appellant’s Limited Appendix, Harris, 
No. 08-CF-1405 (“You heard evidence that Donnell Harris attempted to 
change his appearance to avoid being identified. It is up to you to decide that 
he took these actions. If you find he did so, you may consider this evidence 
as tending to show his feelings of guilt which you may in turn consider as 
tending to show actual guilt. On the other hand, you may also consider that 
he may have taken these actions for reasons fully consistent with innocence in 
this case.” (emphasis added)); see also BARBARA BERGMAN, CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.303(B) (5th ed. 2008). 
The defense argued that the trial court issued this instruction in error because 
the government did not establish that Harris was “attempting to conceal his 
identity by wearing glasses.” Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 6.  
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to [a defendant] doing things like shaving his head, as opposed 
to having dreadlocks . . . [and] shaving his beard, as opposed to 
having facial hair.”181 The defense further argued that Harris 
needed the eyeglasses in order to “read through voluminous 
material,” although there was no such evidence presented at trial 
to back this assertion.182 The prosecution rebutted the defense’s 
stance by calling two key witnesses to testify that they had never 
previously seen Harris wearing eyeglasses.183 At trial, the 
government argued that Harris’ eyewear was “an attempt at 
concealment” because “eyeglasses do change appearance 
. . . .”184 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court 
that the “wearing of glasses at trial had some probative value[] 
and that the prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative 
value.”185 The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, in 
part, because the appeals court determined that Harris’ rights 
had not been prejudiced by the change-of-appearance 
instruction.186 
                                                          
181 Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–5.   
182 Id. at 5. The trial court informed the jury that “there is no evidence in 
the record that Mr. Harris needs glasses to read or anything else,” finding 
Harris’ explanation for his use of eyeglasses to be mere “speculation.” Id.; 
see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 30 n.32.  
183 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 6 (noting that the defense 
argued that eyeglasses could not conceal the identity of the defendant to 
someone who knew him well and pointing out that one witness knew Harris 
his entire life and another witness encountered Harris on a regular basis as a 
routine customer); see also Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–5 (observing that 
Francis Iwuh knew Harris since infancy and Marion Sesay knew Harris as a 
regular customer at the Steak and Egg Restaurant where the shooting took 
place). 
184 Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 5; Leder et al., supra note 24, 
at 212; Tillman, supra note 5 (quoting U.S. Attorney John Gidez, who 
argued “that even if [wearing eyeglasses] was not a profound change, it could 
still alter Harris’ appearance enough to potentially cause a non-identification 
or misidentification by witnesses who didn’t know Harris well enough to 
recognize him with or without glasses”).  
185 Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5. The trial court’s reasoning aligns with 
the proposition that a defendant’s appearance may become relevant evidence 
if it “forms the basis of identification” in the case. Levenson, supra note 79, 
at 577 n.19.  
186  Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 6 (affirming the lower court ruling and 
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The D.C. Court of Appeals premised its justification for 
upholding the lower court’s change-of-appearance instruction on 
two factors: (1) a defendant’s identification must be at issue and 
(2) a defendant must have “significant[ly]” changed his or her 
appearance before trial.187 The fundamental problem with this 
opinion is that it does not define the scope of “identification” 
matters for purposes of issuing a change-of-appearance 
instruction.188 Does the defendant’s identification need to be 
specifically at issue, as it was in Harris, for the court to 
properly issue a change-of-appearance instruction? Or can the 
holding in Harris be interpreted to encompass all situations in 
which a witness is asked to identify the defendant simply as a 
procedural requirement—even when no genuine issue of 
identification is present?189 Harris leaves unanswered two critical 
                                                          
holding that even if the change-of-appearance instruction was in error, it was 
harmless under Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946)); 
Zoe Tillman, Appeals Court Rules Glasses Instruction Not Prejudicial in 
Murder Trial, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 24, 2012, 1:33 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/10/appeals-court-rules-glasses-
instruction-not-prejudicial-in-murder-trial.html. 
187  Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5–6 (focusing on identification by 
relying heavily on United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), which reasoned that a defendant’s change in appearance should have 
been coupled with “anticipa[tion] that witnesses would be called at trial to 
identify him”). 
188 Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 (noting that the trial court recognized 
that a change in the defendant’s appearance must be significant to warrant a 
change-of-appearance instruction). The trial court touched on the scope of the 
change-of-appearance instruction when the trial judge stated, “I’m not sure if 
[wearing glasses] is [an] attempt to change his appearance so he couldn’t be 
identified. It’s not like he changed his appearance before a lineup or before 
some photographic identification. He’s wearing glasses now.” Brief of 
Appellant, supra note 173, at 5. Still, the trial court issued the instruction 
and the appeals court affirmed the instruction without any further 
clarification. Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 6.  
189 When the defense stipulates to a defendant’s identification, there is no 
genuine issue as to identification. Compare United States v. Alexander, 48 
F.3d 1477, 1490 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Identification of the defendant as the 
person who committed the charged crime is always an essential element 
which the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt.”), with 
United States v. Darrell, 629 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] witness 
need not physically point out a defendant so long as the evidence is sufficient 
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questions: (1) Can the change-of-appearance instruction be given 
in a case in which a defendant’s identification is not specifically 
at issue but the defendant wears nonprescriptive eyeglasses to 
trial? and (2) How should a judge instruct the jury concerning a 
defendant’s “significant” change of appearance when the 
defendant’s identity is not specifically at issue?190 This type of 
defendant is not attempting to avoid identification;191 rather, he 
or she is attempting to misguide the jury with persistent and 
subtle changes in appearance that are intimately linked with 
society’s most deeply rooted stereotypes.192 To avoid such 
misguidance, a jury should be instructed in a manner that 
balances a defendant’s right of expression against the jury’s right 
to the truth. 
B. Carefully Balancing a Defendant’s Constitutional Rights 
Against Potential Jury Manipulation 
A defendant’s right to a fair trial is one of his or her 
fundamental liberties, a right protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.193 Due Process Clause 
principles firmly hold that the State cannot force a defendant to 
appear before a jury in a manner that suggests that the defendant 
                                                          
to permit the inference that the person on trial was the person who committed 
the crime.”).  
190 This question is unanswered by the court in Harris. Harris is the first 
case focusing solely on a defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses to signal 
a “significant” change in appearance and thus justifying the resulting jury 
instruction. Compare Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5, with Carr, 373 F.3d at 
1353 (looking at a combination of the defendant’s beard, weight, and glasses 
to signal “profound alterations” in appearance and justifying the resulting 
jury instruction). 
191 A defendant who stipulates to identification is not attempting to avoid 
being identified. Attempting to avoid identification through a significant 
change in appearance would warrant the issuing of a change-of-appearance 
instruction to the jury. See Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–5.  
192 See Hellström & Tekle, supra note 20, at 695 (articulating that 
judgments about intelligence and successfulness can be traced back to the 
development of myopia caused by extensive schoolwork in childhood days).  
193 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 
(1976).  
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is guilty.194 During trial, a defendant is “on display for the 
jury.”195 Consequently, members of the jury might notice and 
take into account details of the defendant’s appearance that 
nonjurors might find irrelevant.196 But how far may a defendant 
go to change his or her appearance in order to convey 
innocence? Courts have held that a defendant may wear to trial 
such clothing items as religious cult wear,197 sweatshirts with 
religious symbols,198 and official military academy dress 
uniforms.199 A defendant has a First Amendment right to control 
his or her appearance at trial.200 Generally, this right is subject to 
the judge’s discretion.201 However, when a defendant’s dress in 
the courtroom involves religious attire, the standard for 
                                                          
194 Shepard, supra note 82, at 2208.  
195 Levenson, supra note 79, at 575.  
196 THORNTON, supra note 83, at 112; see also Levenson, supra note 79, 
at 574 (noting that “the outcome of the case is affected by many factors that 
are technically not evidence: the quality of the lawyers’ presentations, the 
appearance and reaction of the defendant in the courtroom, and even the 
presence of the victim’s representatives”). 
197 See United States v. Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 
1992) (holding that defendants may choose to wear to trial religious cult 
uniforms, including white robes and white turbans).  
198 Joseph v. State, 642 So. 2d 613, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that defendants may wear to trial shirts with religious symbols). 
199 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 819, 820–21 (Va. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that defendants may wear to trial official military uniforms).  
200 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1115 (R.I. 
1978) (recognizing the mandate in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), 
to strike a balance between a defendant’s First Amendment right and the 
“interest of the court in maintaining decorum in its proceedings by regulating 
dress in the courtroom”); see also Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. at 1345 (stating that 
defendants may choose to wear “suitable clothing of their choice in the 
courtroom”). 
201 Johnson, 449 S.E.2d at 820–21 (“The conduct of a trial includes 
courtroom decorum. The trial court has the duty and the authority, in the 
exercise of sound discretion, to require persons attending court to dress in a 
manner appropriate to their functions and consistent with the publicity and 
dignity of the courtroom.”); see also Catherine Theresa Clarke, Missed 
Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1001 (1991) (noting 
the concern that some clothing can distract or offend judges as “a breach of 
etiquette because it undermines the serious, professional atmosphere of the 
proceedings”). 
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regulating such dress is higher: the government must 
demonstrate a compelling interest.202 
By wearing nonprescripive eyeglasses to trial, a defendant 
attempts to cultivate an image premised on potentially 
misleading character traits that are associated with wearing 
eyeglasses.203 A defendant’s use of nonprescriptive eyeglasses 
therefore presents a unique challenge to the criminal court 
system: it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to prohibit a 
defendant’s free expression through the use of nonprescriptive 
eyeglasses at trial, but it is also inconsistent with the truth-
seeking principles of the judicial system to allow a defendant to 
purposefully mislead a jury. This Note proposes a modified 
change-of-appearance instruction that mitigates potential jury 
manipulation and that does not carry with it the same 
presumption of guilt as a standard change-of-appearance 
instruction concerning specific identification matters.  
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Harris confirms that the prosecution may inquire into a 
defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses and request a change-
                                                          
202 See In re Palmer, 386 A.2d at 1115 (noting the need in the courtroom 
to “accommodate the right to exercise the religious freedoms safeguarded by 
the first amendment with the right of the state to regulate these individual 
freedoms for the sake of societal interests”); see also McMillan v. State, 265 
A.2d 453, 456 (Ct. App. Md. 1970) (stating that “[w]e are fully aware that 
the orderly administration of courts of justice requires the maintenance of 
dignity and decorum and for that reason rules of conduct and behavior to 
govern participants are essential . . . . Understandably, respect for the courts 
is something in which the State has a compelling interest”). 
203 See Brown, supra note 9, at 2–6 (finding that defendants who wear 
eyeglasses appear more intelligent and less physically threatening); Terry & 
Krantz, supra note 41, at 1766 (finding that wearing eyeglasses increases 
ratings for character, compassion, honesty, and sensitivity—but that 
eyeglasses decrease ratings of attractiveness and forcefulness); Harris, supra 
note 56, at 1674 (finding that those who wear eyeglasses appear more timid 
and more intelligent than those who do not wear eyeglasses); Aylin Zafar, 
“Hipster” Glasses Might Get You Off the Hook in Court, TIME (Mar. 30, 
2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/30/hipster-glasses-might-get-you-
off-the-hook-in-court/ (noting that eyeglasses help make an individual appear 
“a little emasculated”).  
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of-appearance instruction when the defendant’s identification is 
specifically at issue.204 Presumably, this is because eyeglasses 
tend to cover a significant portion of the eye region and can 
restructure the appearance of facial features,205 making it difficult 
to recognize a defendant who wears eyeglasses.206 In Harris, the 
appeals court agreed with the lower court that the “wearing of 
glasses at trial [has] some probative value” which is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.207 However, when a 
defendant’s identification is not specifically at issue, the 
prosecution cannot request a change-of-appearance instruction 
because such an instruction is designed to address changes in 
appearance related to potential misidentification.208 This Note 
proposes two possible solutions to this problem. 
A. Modifying the Change-of-Appearance Instruction When 
the Defendant’s Identification Is Not Specifically at 
Issue  
A defendant’s use of nonprescriptive eyewear at trial 
generally constitutes a specific attempt to intentionally misguide 
the jury, and it works against the fundamental principles of a 
judicial system that seeks the truth in all cases. Jury awareness 
of this tactic will help to lessen the impact of intentional jury 
manipulation. As currently utilized by courts, the change-of-
appearance instruction is particularly harsh because it can imply 
a consciousness of guilt.209 Although change-of-appearance 
                                                          
204 Harris v. United States, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
205 SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.21, at 42.  
206 See Leder et al., supra note 24, at 216–18 (finding that “glasses 
impede the immediate recognition of faces” because it takes longer to 
recognize faces with full-rim glasses than it does to recognize faces either 
without glasses or with rimless glasses). 
207  Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5. 
208 United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1991); see 
also MULDOON, supra note 16, § 9:262 (“The prosecutor may properly 
comment on the defendant’s changed appearance at trial, as compared to the 
time of the crime, where identification is a trial issue.”). 
209 Inferences drawn about a defendant’s “consciousness of guilt” 
reasonably “flow[] from any change of appearance” instruction that is given 
to the jury. Perkins, 937 F.2d at 1403; People v. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d 
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instructions typically specify that the charge does not carry a 
presumption of guilt, jurors might be unable to ignore the harsh 
language of the instruction or jurors might give the inference too 
much weight.210 For these reasons, the standard change-of-
appearance instruction should be reserved for situations in which 
a defendant has significantly changed his or her appearance and 
where his or her identification is specifically at issue in the case.  
A defendant who seeks to encourage misidentification 
through the use of unnecessary eyewear should be distinguished 
from a defendant who requires a prescription for eyeglasses.211 
When a defendant dons unnecessary eyeglasses for purposes of 
persuasion212—but not for purposes of misidentification—the jury 
should be made aware through a modified change-of-appearance 
instruction.  
This Note’s proposed modification of the change-of-
appearance instruction removes the language connecting a 
defendant’s change of appearance to his or her consciousness of 
guilt in order to account for a defendant’s right of free 
expression. The modification expands the scope of a standard 
change-of-appearance instruction to cover a defendant’s use of 
eyeglasses as a means to unofficially introduce persuasive and 
                                                          
886, 890, 893 (1968) (noting that the defendant’s significant change in 
appearance correlated to consciousness of guilt because “consciousness of 
guilt can reasonably be inferred from [defendant’s] action in shaving off his 
beard shortly after the [crime]”); see also Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 
(quoting Lazo v. United States, 930 A.2d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) 
(“‘When supported by the evidence, we have recognized the legitimacy of’ 
the change of appearance argument based on the attempted change of 
appearance jury instruction.”). 
210 See generally Levenson, supra note 79, at 581 (“Juries are not 
machines and courtrooms are not laboratories. Laboratories are controlled 
environments in which trial and error are accepted protocol. Even with rules 
of evidence, trials do not assume the same type of controlled, sterile 
environment.”).  
211 A defendant who “significantly changes” his or her appearance before 
trial in a case where his or her identity is specifically at issue has, by default, 
changed appearance to avoid identification. Attempting to avoid identification 
would warrant the issuing of a standard change-of-appearance instruction. 
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5–6. 
212 For example, a defendant with no history of wearing eyeglasses who 
then wears eyeglasses to trial and whose identity is not specifically at issue.  
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misleading character evidence and further instructs the jury on 
how to properly consider such a tactic. This change-of-
appearance instruction should be given when: (1) a defendant 
dons unnecessary eyeglasses to trial and (2) identification of the 
defendant is not specifically at issue. The proposed modification, 
adapted from the instructions given in Carr213 and Harris,214 
reads as follows: 
During trial, the defendant changed his or her appearance 
by wearing eyeglasses that he or she does not need. This 
particular alteration in appearance after the commission 
of a crime and in preparation for trial does not create a 
presumption of guilt. It is entirely possible that an 
innocent person would resort to both lawful and unlawful 
means to avoid prosecution. The wearing of unnecessary 
eyeglasses at trial is lawful.  
 In this case, the defendant’s wearing of eyeglasses 
constituted a falsification of a vision deficiency. You may 
consider this falsification an attempt by the defendant to 
gain favorable judgment based upon the positive social 
stereotypes associated with the wearing of eyeglasses, 
which can include truthfulness, intelligence, and 
nonaggressive demeanor.  
 When you consider the evidence presented in this case, 
you may take into account the defendant’s choice to 
appear at trial wearing eyeglasses that he or she does not 
need. You are not required to do so.  
A defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses at trial silently and 
unofficially introduces character evidence.215 Consequently, when 
                                                          
213 See United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
214 See Trial Transcript at 87–88, United States v. Harris, No. CF1-
18801-07 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2008), reprinted in Appellant’s Limited 
Appendix, Harris, No. 08-CF-1405. 
215 See Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (using a case with “purposefully 
ambiguous evidence” to examine the effect of eyeglasses on juror perceptions 
of defendants and finding both a direct link between eyeglasses and 
perception of increased intelligence and a correlation between increased 
intelligence and fewer guilty verdicts). Everything about a defendant’s 
appearance has an “impact in the courtroom.” SMITH & MALANDRO, supra 
note 2, § 1.26, at 54.  
768 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
a defendant’s identity is only at issue as a procedural 
requirement,216 the prosecution is limited to informing the jury of 
the defendant’s use of unnecessary eyewear through relevant 
admitted evidence, such as photographs,217 answers to juror 
inquiries,218 or evidence first introduced by the defendant.219 
However, these methods are insufficient because they are 
unpredictable and leave jurors to consider evidence concerning 
the defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses but without proper 
instruction as to how to consider such conduct.220  
Any inquiry into a defendant’s unnecessary use of eyeglasses 
at trial will likely be aimed at attacking a defendant’s 
truthfulness.221 However, even if a defendant first introduces 
evidence of his or her truthfulness by taking the stand,222 Federal 
                                                          
216 For example, if the defense stipulates to the defendant’s identity 
before trial.  
217 If a photograph presented as evidence at trial depicts a defendant 
without eyeglasses and the defendant subsequently wears eyeglasses at trial, 
the jury may acknowledge the defendant’s change in appearance.  
218 Certain states allow jurors to pose questions to defendants during trial. 
During Jodi Arias’ capital murder trial, the jury posed two specific questions 
concerning her eyeglasses: “What is your eye prescription?” and “If you are 
so nearsighted then how could you drive?” Graham Winch, Arias Grilled 
With Questions By Jurors, HLN LIVE BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/03/06/live-blog-what-will-jurors-ask-jodi-
arias. 
219 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). 
220 See generally 3 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES 
ON EVIDENCE § 16:26 (7th ed. 1997) (stating that twelve federal circuits 
express a strong preference that when a jury is instructed on the issue of a 
defendant's character, "the judge instruct the jury to consider evidence 
relating to defendant's character together with the rest of the evidence in the 
case"). 
221 “Character” embraces the quality of truthfulness, and although 
“character” does not include having either “good eyesight or impaired 
vision,” a defendant’s eyesight becomes linked to his or her truthfulness 
when determining whether the defendant truly requires eyeglasses. MUELLER 
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, § 4:23.  
222 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, § 4:43 (stating that 
"[w]hen defendants [who take the stand] describe good behavior, patterns, an 
honest, hardworking, nonviolent, or caring disposition, they open to 
prosecutors the right to cross-examine on specific acts relevant to that 
testimony"). 
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Rule of Evidence 608(b) precludes the prosecution’s use of 
extrinsic evidence for the sole purpose of attacking the 
defendant’s truthfulness.223 Subject to the court’s discretion, on 
cross-examination a prosecutor may inquire into the defendant’s 
use of unnecessary eyeglasses if the court deems such 
information to be “probative of the [defendant’s] character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness.”224 Nonetheless, this evidence may 
still be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 due to its 
potential for prejudice.225 Therefore, the modified change-of-
appearance instruction is necessary to adequately inform jurors 
of the defendant’s purposeful attempt to misguide the jury and to 
ensure that jurors are properly instructed as to how to consider 
the defendant’s actions. This Note’s proposed instruction 
functions as a safeguard against potential jury manipulation 
because it provides the prosecution with a means of countering a 
defendant’s strategic use of eyeglasses as a prop to elicit juror 
biases. It ensures that jurors are made aware of and know how 
to consider such information, while at the same time it informs 
jurors that the nerd defense does not correlate to a defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt.  
B. Making an Eyeglasses Inquiry the “Norm” at Trial 
Prosecution teams and law students should be exposed to the 
tactics employed by defense teams. It is important for current 
and future prosecutors to learn how and under what 
circumstances to request a change-of-appearance instruction and 
to learn how to ask questions about a defendant’s misleading 
utilization of eyeglasses. This will ensure that a jury is better 
                                                          
223 See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s notes (stating that Rule 
608(b) “has been amended to clarify that the absolute prohibition on extrinsic 
evidence applies only when the sole reason for proffering that evidence is to 
attack or support the witness’ character for truthfulness”); see also United 
States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the principles 
“embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 608 . . . limit the use of evidence 
designed to show that the witness has done things, unrelated to the suit being 
tried, that make him more or less believable per se”).  
224 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
225 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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equipped to properly consider a defendant’s strategic change of 
appearance. 
If the prosecution is suspicious of a defendant’s sudden use 
of eyeglasses at trial, the prosecution should be allowed to 
inquire, in the absence of the jury, into the defendant’s need for 
eyeglasses. If the defendant is unable or unwilling to offer proof 
of his or her need for eyeglasses—for example, through a 
prescription, evidence of prior use of eyeglasses, or an eye 
exam—then the court should grant the prosecution’s request for 
a modified change-of-appearance jury instruction. One likely 
objection to this rule is that indigent defendants might be unable 
to pay for an eye exam that is necessary to prove their need for 
eyeglasses. As such, any rule requiring defendants to offer proof 
of their need for eyeglasses needs to be accompanied by a rule 
requiring the state to pay for any necessary eye exams. Another 
objection to this rule might be that defendants should not be 
required to assist in their own prosecution. However, wearing 
unnecessary eyeglasses is a defendant’s choice and such a 
strategic accessory serves to mislead the jury. Making an 
eyeglasses inquiry the norm might lead defense attorneys and 
defendants to think twice before employing the nerd defense—
and therefore lessen the ability of defendants to hinder the truth-
seeking process by purposefully eliciting deep-seated biases in 
jurors. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to an 
impartial jury, afforded by the Sixth Amendment,226 is 
fundamental to a fair trial.227 The right to an impartial jury 
includes the right to exclude potentially biased jurors.228 While 
                                                          
226 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury”).  
227 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (stating that 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury trial). 
228 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (holding that “by 
refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice, the trial judge 
failed to adequately protect petitioner’s constitutional right to an impartial 
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the trial process offers a system to exclude jurors with potential 
biases, “jurors may not be willing to reveal their biases, or they 
simply may not recognize they have any biases.”229 To 
counteract unconscious biases held by jurors,230 the Court has 
held that empaneling jurors from “a cross-section of the 
community” is a necessary ingredient of the selection of an 
impartial jury.231 However, when a bias is widely held,232 
selection of a jury in this manner is insufficient by itself to 
counteract such a bias.233 Research shows that stereotypes about 
those who wear eyeglasses are so powerful as to cross 
cultural,234 gendered,235 and racial divides.236 The biases 
                                                          
jury”); Wiley, supra note 74, at 227.  
229 THORNTON, supra note 83, at 108 (noting that “it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to empanel a jury of twelve ‘blank slates’ capable of hearing 
evidence free of influence of past experiences”); see also SUTHERLAND & 
CRESSEY, supra note 85, at 442 (noting that in certain cases, “several 
thousand prospective jurors have been examined before twelve were secured” 
and “[i]n one Chicago trial 9,425 persons were summoned for jury duty and 
4,821 were examined before twelve were finally selected”). 
230 See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and 
Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV. 107, 122 (1994) (noting that the fair-cross-
section doctrine is designed to address juror biases resulting from “deep-
seated hunches and judgments about social life”).  
231 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (holding that “[w]e accept the fair-cross-
section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation”). 
For a discussion of the jury-selection process in the context of gender 
discrimination, see Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946). For a 
discussion of the jury-selection process in the context of racial discrimination, 
see Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).  
232 Wiley, supra note 74, at 230 (arguing that discrimination based on 
physical appearance may be even more “menacing” in American culture than 
racial or gender discrimination because everyone discriminates based on 
appearance). 
233 See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (1978) (“The only 
practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the 
representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective 
biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to 
cancel each other out.”).  
234 See Manz & Lueck, supra note 21, at 704.  
235 See Harris, supra note 56, at 1674–75. 
236 See Brown, supra note 9, at 3.  
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associated with those who wear eyeglasses are deeply ingrained 
in our minds in early stages of life.237 
The United States judicial system is designed to eliminate 
juror biases. Purposefully eliciting any biases from the jury 
undermines the goal of the judicial system, which is to seek the 
truth in all cases.238 While defendants have the right to control 
their appearance at trial, there exists a distinction between a 
defendant who simply presents himself or herself in “neat and 
clean attire” and with “good grooming” and a defendant who 
uses attire to present “an unrealistic suggestion of character.”239 
A defendant who wears unnecessary eyeglasses fabricates a 
vision handicap that is intimately tied to stereotypes of favorable 
characteristics and manipulates the jury into believing a lie: that 
the defendant truly requires eyeglasses. By providing a jury with 
a modified change-of-appearance instruction, a court will enable 
the jury to have a more complete and truthful base of knowledge 
when considering the facts of the case and the jury will be better 
equipped to consider the defendant’s change in appearance.  
                                                          
237 Walline et al., supra note 44, at 223 (describing a study finding that 
children as young as six years old correlate wearing eyeglasses with character 
traits of intelligence and honesty).  
238 Strier, supra note 22, at 99.  
239 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 819, 821 (Va. Ct. App. 
1994). 
